USMNT
The 433 and why the USMNT is “forcing” a playmaking 6
The base formation for the USMNT under Berhalter has been the 433. That’s been unchanged. If you look around the world at some of the best teams, many seem to have the base of a 433. Man City, Liverpool, Real Madrid, Bayern, Barcelona, Ajax. Why is this structure or formation so popular?
I have a theory.
Formations and systems are trendy. It wasn’t that long ago that the 4231 was all anyone had been playing. In the last year, we saw a heavy use of 3 in the back systems across the major teams. Tuchel went from heavily using the 433 at PSG to using a 343 variant at Chelsea to great effect. Man City and Barcelona were seen using the 343 a lot this year too. The base still seems to be the 433.
Strengths and weaknesses
One thing most anyone who has coached soccer or studied soccer for any amount of time will agree on, is that there is no magical formation. Every system has weaknesses and most players and coaches learn those early on.
A few examples:
The advantages and disadvantages of a particular system can fill whole books and videos. There are lots of nuances, variations and adaptations as well. The point is- every system or formation has weaknesses and strengths.
If a team has one way of playing and one set of starting 11, then they become very easy to scheme against. A better talented team may still win. A team can even “punch up” if their particular personnel strengths play to another team’s particular weaknesses and that coach is poor at tactical schemes. But a team playing one starting 11 with the same starting 11, will always be at a disadvantage against a team that has multiple tools in the tool box and an understanding on how to attack your weaknesses.
Tactical Flexibility
Every coach knows the basic answers to a formation’s weaknesses. Therefore the best system is one that is highly adaptable. The 433 is one of the most adaptable systems you can play. With simple role changes, the system can look like a completely different system. (I am purposefully oversimplifying for the examples.)
If your opponent is troubling your 6 or if you’re having trouble with numbers in the midfield you can simply drop an 8 deeper.
The 433 has the most different versions. With one base system, tactically adept managers can get a lot of tactical flexibility. This is how managers like Pep and Tuchel can create so many different problems and solutions out of one team. They try to keep the changes simple and base the same. The run patterns, principles, and solutions to problems can all be the same and the requests of the players can change from game to game.
Fans often can’t see the trees because of the forest. A coach can tweak individual roles and keep the base the same. The forest shape looks different but it was changed with one tree.
Tactical variability
This tactical flexibility has led to a new form of Total Football. Total Football originally was all about interchanging players to different roles on the field. It requires players with the ability to play different positions in game. With the tools of diverse players and a system with flexible tactics, tactically adept managers can create new dimensions of problems to solve and solutions.
Modern soccer tactics have evolved beyond a single structure or formation. A team will use often use at least 4 structures these days. First, is their base. For the US this is the 433.
The second is one in possession that they want to use to break teams down. For the US this is most often the 2323.
The third is what they want to use in a transition and against a mid block.
The last is what they want to use in a low block. This seems to be a 4231 or 4141.
Out of one “formation,” common patterns of play, set solutions to teams attack/ defense patterns, a team can get an incredible amount of tactical variability. It’s why many managers struggle or scoff at the idea of what “formation” they play. They play many in different situations and different match ups. A key to winning close games in modern US soccer tactics is tactical flexibility.
Roles and Role Profiles
The next logical question is- if the US want to be that tactically flexible then why focus on player profiles at all? Why not just put the best 11 out there in the best system you can and play?
My theory is that the 433 creates the most diverse player profiles. If the goal of a system is to be tactically flexible then you need players that can cover a large range for roles. A tactical minded coach would want every possible tool in the tool bag.
This can be true for multiple roles from the 9 to even the GK. The most talked about recently for the US has been the 6. If I was writing a player profile and rating players on their ability to play the 6, it would look something like this:
From a recruitment and development standpoint, you want players that are 5 stars in every category. In the ideal world, you would then have at least 3 players deep at that role. One man is down, then another is up.
No team has that in reality- not even the best teams. The question I get the most about the 6, is why are they forcing a playmaking 6? If they don’t have one, simply don’t play one. I truly think this is a simple misunderstanding of the 6 and how modern teams are constructed. The overall system of play is built with predefine answers to problems created by the opposition. Good teams want all of those tools in the tool bag to win any particular match up.
If you’re in the structure below the most, then playmaking ability becomes very important all over the field to break down a pack defense. Against Honduras late, they had them backed into a low block and needed Brooks to play extremely high up to make a play over the top to McKennie that leads to the winning goal.
Even earlier in the game, the US seemed to work to keep Honduras out of the low block by making plays deeper with their CB’s. Without Brooks playing fantastically and without Honduras failing to man mark him- the US may not win that game. Wanting a playmaking 6 in that scenario made a lot of sense. If you go back and watch how badly he missed lots of opportunities, it highlights the need for that attribute on the team rather than the reverse.
Even in a low block set up, transition play often starts with the 6 from deep. They either provide an outlet to start the attack or a quick counter pass to start the attack. Adams, who is somewhat of a specialist for RB Leipzig in this, is probably at his best in starting the counter- as a playmaking 6. That is a key attribute of the role. One reason the US struggled to counter, build or do much offensively against Mexico is Acosta is a better disruptor and wasn’t much of an asset in the attack. It’s a key part of the role profile and having that player profile adds tactical flexibility.
Let’s look at Nashville SC as a counter example. Their base formation has been a 4231. Dax is something of a modern 6 but Godoy is more of a 6/8 hybrid. He’s more comfortable tackling than driving forward with the ball, making line breaking passes, or linking play. He often plays as a 6/8 in front of Dax, but because their base formation is 4231, their player profiles hedged defensively. One could say its’ worked with the level of success they’ve had for an expansion side but that base has limited their tactical flexibility.
You can move Godoy to an 8 and play more of a 433, but the team will still be a more defensive team than offensive. It’s how they were constructed. The player profiles provide the template for the tools the team wants in the tool bag. Those tools can determine how a team plays as much or more than formation.
The #9 as a comparison
Would you say the same thing of the 9? If we don’t have a striker, just don’t play one? No- you specialize per match up.
We saw this a great deal with Chelsea (and Man City) and the #9 last year. What any team would want in a #9 player profile would be things like hold up ability, intelligent runs, poaching/finishing ability, aerial ability, speed to get in behind and playmaking ability to drop into the midfield to move the CB’s and create opportunities for others. Neither Chelsea nor Man City had a #9 who fit all of those attributes this year. So they used the players they had as specialist for particular match ups.
This is simply what good teams do. Giroud, Havertz, and Werner give you different attributes all by playing the same role, the same way but with different strengths. Havertz will do better coming back and creating. He’ll pull Cbs up and out more. Giroud will win headers, provide a target to combine with and Werner will stretch them vertically. They will do this though all playing the same patterns. The system needs to run the same so that the players quickly use the right solution to the right problem provided by the opposition.
You don’t tell Werner to stop trying to win aerial balls. You don’t tell Giroud to never drop into the midfield. You don’t change the team’s patterns of play based on who is available or preferred that game. You just pick the right players with correct attributes for a particular match up. When coaches get this right it makes these specialists look world class. When they get it wrong, you get fans thinking the players and coach are trash. This was seen a lot with Giroud last year and Jorginho and Kante through the years. Ask Kante to be the deeper playmaker and he seems a flawed player. Let him be a disrupter (either as a 6 or 8) and he looks world class. Same for Jorginho. Set him up to be a deeper play maker and positional defense expert, and he looks world class. Ask him to be a disrupter or destroyer and he looks horrible.
What managers who compete with the best teams and best managers in the world want, is that tactical diversity at the highest level. They then need to define what those attributes are so teams can recruit and acquire them.
Poorer teams or national teams with less options to buy talent do a similar process but have to rely even more on specialists to fill roles. They are even less likely to get players who are the best at every attribute of a role. They rely more on specialists. Some teams are graced with Rodri who can do everything a role demands. Or teams like France who are simply more talented than everyone else. Many teams are not and what they do is select the right specialist for the particular match up.
The structure (formation) of a team can change from game to game and even within a game. The player profiles are the base players that a coach/manager wants to build around. With club teams, it’s who they recruit, transfer for, and develop. For national teams it’s really the same except transfer. It’s the base roles that they want to recruit (dual nationals), discover through scouting their profile, and develop by getting them recognized for bigger teams.
By having player profiles, a club can build a squad with the most tactical options. The weaker the team’s talent pool, the more reliant a team will be on specialists. The deeper the talent pool, the more tools a manager has in his tool bag to create problems for the opposition.
The US have unique problems as they have a huge drop off from most of their starting players to their depth. It creates more emphasis on getting those specialist right and much greater criticism when those specialist fail at their role.
The US are not forcing anything
The trick in the modern game is not having one tactical setup that you roll out every match. It’s how tactically diverse can your team be? They have to predict which structures will be used the most in a given game. Will we be in the low block the most? Will we be in the high press the most? Will we be breaking down the low block the most? How can we force the other team to be in the set up that we most want? Then- what player attributes do I have in my tool box to keep us in that formation and win the game? How do I ensure that I have the right variety of tools to match 90% of the problems we’ll see?
The US is not forcing a playmaking 6. They have a player profile for every position and then are attempting to choose the right tool for the right matchup. Yueill over Acosta to break down Honduras and make plays from deep (which he did poorly). Siebatcheu for Sargent to win balls in the air. Acosta for Yueill to add disruption and rangy press.
I think we can all expect this to continue and not stop as the player pool increases in talent. Right now Adams is levels better at most every attribute of the player profile at the 6, but even if we can get 23 players who are all world class- current modern tactics likely dictate a player will be chosen per match up rather than a simple depth chart. While fans love to create depth charts at every position, the reality of those depth charts are likely a lot more complicated.
Why the 433 and 433 profiles?
The 433 and its profiles fill out the tool bag and sets up a diverse operating template for the modern soccer chess match.
Club News
Who’s a Keeper?
Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)
The USMNT has had a solid track record with goalkeepers over the last three decades. There seems to be a problematic situation with their current group. Is this an overreaction or a real concern for the USMNT which is less than 2 years away from hosting the 2026 FIFA World Cup?
The average age of the last seven USMNT goalkeepers to regularly start in one of the top two tiers in Europe is 27.5 years old and while it took several seasons for Kasey Keller, Brad Friedel, Tim Howard, and Brad Guzan to settle and have continued success they did while all having the opportunity to be the number goalkeeper for the USMNT.
Where there has been a lot of deserved criticism towards Matt Turner’s play with the USMNT lately it’s clear that he remains the best shot-stopper in the pool, but also clear that a transfer from Nottingham Forest is desperately needed to provide regular playing for Turner. Turner’s foot skills remain weak along with the rest of the USMNT goalkeeper pool very much an area that needs improving. Something they could learn from Tony Meola who was hands down the best USMNT goalkeeper with his feet.
Struggles also continue for Ethan Horvath whose transfer to Cardiff City last February was supposed to provide him with the needed playing time to push Turner for the number one goalkeeper spot of the USMNT but, his performance at Copa America didn’t inspire many, along with a recent match for Cardiff City where he conceded five goals.
November 27, 2022, in Doha, Qatar (Photo by Tim Nwachukwu/Getty Images)
USMNT Youth Goalkeepers
The current group of USMNT goalkeeper prospects appears to be solid, but if history has proven anything there are no guarantees. The list of the failed USMNT youth keepers over the last decade is long. It includes names like Joe Bendik, Alex Bono, Cody Cropper, Tally Hall, Clint Irwin, Dan Kennedy, and Luis Robles, of the over 15 USMNT prospect goalkeepers who have only been capped 18 times, eight of those held by Bill Hamid.
At the moment goalkeepers Antonio Carrera (20), Matt Freese (25), Chituru Odunze (21), and John Pulskamp (23) are on the outside looking in compared to the goalkeepers listed below.
Currently playing for Fulham U-21 Premier League 2 (Reserve League) Alex Borto (20) who was part of the 2023 U-20 World in May and June, but didn’t receive any playing time will need to increase his current playing time to get more opportunities but, I feel Borto is much lower on the youth USMNT depth chart at the moment.
A regular starter for the Chicago Fire over the last couple of seasons Chris Brady (20) is another highly touted USMNT goalkeeper, who has been held back from regularly being called into USMNT youth camps by his club. A move to Europe would provide him with the next level of competition needed to continue his growth as a goalkeeper.
Who would trust a now 18-year-old who hasn’t had any professional experience to start for the USMNT? Not many but Diego Kochen (18) who is currently with FC Barcelona Atlètic in the Third Division is a name that continues to be mentioned, but highly unlikely in my opinion.
As the starter for all four of the U-23 USMNT Olympic matches Patrick Schulte (23) has earned a call-up to the USMNT. Schulte has had a very strong season with the Columbus Crew which accounts for 8 clean sheets over all matches at the time of this article.
Many fans think Gaga Slonina (20) is the best U-23 goalkeeper in the player pool and is destined to be the number-one goalkeeper after the 2026 cycle. Slonina is currently playing in EFL League One the third division in England. Slonina was the starting goalkeeper for U-20 USMNT where he had four straight clean sheets helping lead the US to the quarter-finals. He also was part of the U-23 USA Olympic team but failed to receive any playing time.
October 4, 2022, (Photo by Christian Hansen/Chicago Fire FC)
Aging or Bridge Goalkeeper Options
The list of recent third and often injured USMNT goalkeepers Drake Callender (26), Roman Celentano (23), Sean Johnson (35), and Zack Steffen (29) provide little to no confidence when looking at a current solution and none are likely to break into the top two of the depth chart but, stranger things have happened in the world of USMNT goalkeepers.
Looking Ahead
With less than 2 years until the 2026 FIFA World Cup, it’s unlikely that any of the younger USMNT goalkeepers will be able to play at higher levels and contend for the number one spot, which I believe still belongs to Matt Turner, but, Turner needs to do whatever possible to get a transfer to another top five leagues or worse case Eredivisie or EFL Championship as he needs to be playing matches every week to ensure he’s in form and improving headed into the World Cup with the backup position is up for grabs.
USMNT
Gregg Berhalter’s Legacy
USMNT
What’s in a Resume?
Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)
A look back at the full-time USMNT Manager’s resumes before they were hired
You can’t go anywhere on social media today without seeing passionate fans, former USMNT players, and media asking for Gregg Berhalter to be fired, and rightfully so after the USMNT was grouped at the 2024 Copa America. The USMNT became the first team since 1993 when the tournament went from a Round-Robin format to a Group Stage & Knockout Stage format to not make it out of the group stage.
Most fans are well aware of how, but maybe not why Gregg Berhalter was hired not once, but twice as the USMNT manager and continue to wonder why he was the chosen one due to his unimpressive resume.
History of the past Full-Time USMNT Managers
The USMNT hired its first full-time manager in 1976 a decade and a half after beating England 1-0 at the 1950 World Cup, during that stretch the USMNT would hire and fire 17 managers with only George Meyer being rehired who failed twice to qualify the USMNT for the World Cup.
Since 1976 the USMNT has also employed 17 managers three who have managed the national team multiple times and five who were caretakers.
Here’s a look at the resumes of the nine full-time managers at the time of being hired to lead the USMNT along with their records as national team manager.
Walter Chyzowych – July 1976 – November 1980
8 Wins, 10 Draws and 14 Losses, GF-26, GA-50
Walter Chyzowych’s coaching career started as the caretaker of the Philadelphia Textile in 1961 and he ended up coaching the team until 1975, during that time he was also an assistant for Philadelphia Ukrainian Nationals from 1971 to 1975.
In 1975 the U.S. Soccer Federation hired Chyzowych as their director of coaching a position he would hold until 1981. Chyzowych the first full-time USMNT manager would coach the national team for two World Cup cycles (1978 and 1982) failing to qualify for the World Cup both times. Chyzowych’s signature win came on the road against 21st ELO-ranked Hungary a 2-0 win on October 26, 1979. It’s also worth noting that Chyzowych’s older brother Eugene managed the USMNT for three matches in 1973.
Alketas ‘Alkis’ Panagoulias – January 1983 – June 1985
6 Wins, 7 Draws and 5 Losses, GF-19, GA-21
Panagoulias’s coaching career started in 1967 when he coached the New York Greek Americans to three consecutive National Challenge Cup titles in 1967, 1968, and 1969. In 1972 he was hired as the assistant coach for Greece under the legendary Billy Bingham of Northern Ireland. Panagoulias would be employed as the Greece national team manager in 1973. He would coach the Greece national team until 1981. Panagoulias would help Greece qualify for the UEFA Euro 1980, where they would fail to get out of the group.
In 1981 Panagoulias left the Greece national team and would coach Olympiacos for three seasons where he would win the Alpha Ethniki title in 1982 and 1983.
In 1983 US Soccer hired Panagoulias as the USMNT manager, at that time Panagoulias would manage the national team, Team America (1983), and the 1984 US Soccer Olympic team. Panagoulias would fail to qualify for the 1986 World Cup, but came very close to advancing to the final round of qualifying, but lost in a must-win home match to Costa Rice 1-0.
Bob Gansler – January 16, 1989 – February 23, 1991
15 Wins, 6 Draws and 16 Losses, GF-43, GA-41
The former USMNT defender held several coaching positions with the youth team from the mid-1970s until 1989 when he led the U-20 USYNT to fourth place at the 1989 FIFA World Youth Championship, while also serving as the head coach at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee men’s soccer team from 1984 through 1988. Gansler also coached the USMNT for one match in 1982, a 1-0 win against Trinidad & Tobago. Bob Gansler was the first USMNT manager in 40 years to qualify for the World Cup.
Bora Milutinović – March 27, 1991 – April 14, 1995
30 Wins, 31 Draws and 35 Losses, GF-116, GA-110
Bora started his coaching career in 1977 when he was hired as the manager of the UNAM Pumas where he coached until 1983. Bora would win two trophies as the UNAM manager of the Concacaf Champions League and Mexican Champion in the 1980/1981 season.
Bora would next become the Mexican National Team manager in 1983 and coach them at the 1986 World Cup hosted by Mexico. The team would finish sixth and end up losing in penalty kicks to West Germany, who would lose in the Final to Argentina.
After leaving Mexico in 1986 Bora would have a handful of other manager jobs in South and Central America and on short stint in Italy where he would coach Udinese nine matches.
Bora was hired as the Costa Rican National Team manager in 1990 and would coach them at the 1990 World Cup in Italy. Bora would once again get his team out of the group and into the knockout stage. Costa Rica would end up finishing 13th after losing to Czechoslovakia 4-1 in the Round of 16
Steve Sampson – April 15, 1995 – June 29, 1998
26 Wins, 14 Draws and 22 Losses, GF-83, GA-69
Steve Sampson’s coaching career started as the boy’s varsity soccer coach at Awalt High School in Mountain View, California, where he would coach for two seasons, followed by being an assistant coach at Foothill Owls and the UCLA Bruins where he would be part of the coaching staff of the team that would win the 1985 NCAA men’s soccer championship.
Sampson would finally get his first college coaching job when he was hired by Santa Clara Broncos in 1986. Sampson would lead his 1989 Santa Clara Broncos to the NCAA Men’s Soccer Championship against Virginia who was coached by Bruce Arena. The teams would battle through regulation & four overtime and end up being named Santa Clara and Virginia as co-champions.
In 1993 Sampson was hired as an assistant to Bora Milutinović and was on the staff during the 1994 World Cup team.
Bruce Arena – October 26, 1998 – July 14, 2006
71 Wins, 29 Draws and 30 Losses, GF-210, GA-98
Arena was hired as the head soccer coach of Virginia a job he would keep for 18 years. In his time with Virginia Arena won five NCAA Division I men’s soccer championships (1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994) and would coach many USMNTs like Claudio Reyna, Jeff Agoos, Ben Olsen, John Harkes, and Tony Meola.
In 1996 Arena would leave Virginia and coach in the inaugural first season of Major League Soccer for D.C. United where he would end up winning two MLS Championships, one Concacaf Champions Cup, and one Supporter Shield
Arena would also coach the U-23 USMNT team at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia where they would finish third in the group with four points.
Bob Bradley – December 8, 2006 – July 28, 2011
43 Wins, 12 Draws and 25 Losses, GF-134, GA-97
In 1982 Bradley began his coaching career at Ohio University where he coached for two seasons. Bradley would then become an assistant coach under Bruce Arena at Virginia before returning to his alma mater Princeton where he would coach for 11 seasons he would win two Ivy League titles and finished fourth at the 1993 NCAA Division I men’s soccer tournament.
In 1996 Arena would once again hire Bradley to be an assistant coach with him at D.C. United for two seasons. Bradley would also be the Arena’s assistant coach at the 1996 Summer Olympics.
Bradley would finally get his first manager job in the MLS when he was hired by the Chicago Fire in 1998 where he won the MLS Cup as well as the U.S. Open Cup in their first season in the MLS. Bradley would go on to also coach the MetroStars (New York Red Bulls) and Chivas USA while complying with a record of 150 Wins, 74 Draws, and 108 Losses with those three MLS teams, before being hired as the USMNT.
Jürgen Klinsmann – July 29, 2011 – October 13, 2016
55 Wins, 16 Draws and 27 Losses, GF-178, GA-109
Jurgen_Klinsmann
Klinsmann would be hired as the German National Team manager in 2004 after a disastrous showing at UEFA Euros. Klinsmann would lead the Germans to the semi-finals of the 2006 World Cup where they would lose in extra time to Italy and end up defeating Portugal in the Third Place playoff match. Soon after the 2006 World Cup Klinsmann declined the offer to renew his contract.
Klinsmann would become the coach of Bayern Munich in July 2008. Klinsmann would get Bayern Munich to the quarter-finals where they would lose to eventual UEFA Champions League winner Barcelona. Klinsmann would be fired with five matches remaining in the Bundesliga season 2008-2009 but would finish in second place in the table two points behind VfL Wolfsburg.
Toronto FC hired Klinsmann in November of 2010 as the team’s technical consultant to help with coaching and player evaluation.
Gregg Berhalter – December 2, 2018 – TBD
44 Wins, 13 Draws and 17 Losses, GF-144, GA-65
In Berhalter’s third and final season as a player with the Los Angeles Galaxy was added as one of the assistant coaches due to his leadership abilities. Berhalter played very few matches due to ongoing and lingering injuries. The Galaxy led by Bruce Arena would end up winning the 2011 Supporters’ Shield and the 2011 MLS Cup.
Manager Rumors and Speculations
We’ve seen many lists and thoughts on who the next USMNT manager should be if Gregg Berhalter either steps down or is sacked by US Soccer. The USMNT needs an experienced manager who can get the most out of the group while providing winning results.
American Manager Options
Several American options are currently under contract like Steve Chreudolo (Los Angeles FC), Jim Curtin (Philadelphia Union), former USMNT manager Bob Bradley (Stabæk), or Pellegrino Matarazzo (TSG Hoffenheim) all seem very unlikely unless they can find a way out of their contracts, which was a problem when hiring Gregg Berhalter, which is why they waited over a year to hire him.
Then you have several former unattached USMNT players Tab Ramos (former Youth Technical Director and U-20 USMNT manager) Hugo Perez (former El Salvador manager) and David Wagner (former Norwich manager) who could be considered, all who would make great assistances to the next manager and or candidates for the 2030 cycle.
There is also Bruce Arena who’s sitting at home right now and might want to redeem himself.
Foreign High Profile Managers
These lists also include big names like Jurgen Klopp who is currently traveling around the United States on this 4th of July weekend or Marcelo Gallardo formerly manager of Al-Ittihad or Mauricio Pochettino most recently the manager of Chelsea for one season. Other big name managers who are currently available include Xavi formerly with Barcelona or Zinédine Zidane but those options aren’t going to happen.
Ideal International Manager Options
At this point in the cycle, the USMNT must hire a manager with International experience to prepare the USMNT for the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Here’s a look at managers with International expertise and their record as an International manager.
Joachim Löw (64) – Free Agent – Former German National Team Manager (2006-2021)
124 Wins, 40 Draws & 34 Losses, GF-467, GA-200
- 2008 – UEFA Euro – Runners Up
- 2010 – World Cup – Finished Third
- 2012 – UEFA Euro – Lost in semi-finals
- 2014 – World Cup – Champions
- 2016 – UEFA Euro – Lost in semi-finals
- 2017 – Confederations Cup – Champions
- 2018 – World Cup – Finished 22nd & last in their group
- 2020 – UEFA Euro – Lost in Round of 16
Joachim Löw International’s resume and results speak for themselves. While I am not sure if he would accept an offer to coach the USMNT he checks all the boxes.
Hervé Renard (55) – France WNT
70 Wins, 38 Draws & 46 Losses, GF-205, GA-142
- 2010 – CAF Africa Cup of Nations – Lost in the Quarter-Finals in PKs – Finished 6th
- 2012 – CAF Africa Cup of Nations – Champions
- 2013 – Eliminated in the group stage – Finished 12th
- 2015 – CAF Africa Cup of Nations – Champions
- 2018 – World Cup – Eliminated in the group stage – Finished 27th
- 2022 – World Cup – Eliminated in the group stage – Finished 25th
The French women’s national team manager is preparing for the 2024 Olympics, whose contract ends after the 2024 Olympics. Renard’s International experience with five different nations over six stints with Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Ivory Coast, Angola, and two stints with Zambia.
Jorge Sampaoli (64) – Free Agent – Former Chile (2012-2016) & Argentina (2017-2018) National Team Manager
34 Wins, 13 Draws & 12 Losses, GF-116, GA-65
- 2014 – World Cup – Lost in Round of 16 in PKs
- 2015 – Copa America – Champions
- 2018 – World Cup – Lost in Round of 16
While Sampaoli’s International coaching career has been limited he has been successful in his stints as well as winning four trophies as manager of Club Universidad de Chile in the early 2010’s
Senol Gunes (72) – Free Agent
38 Wins, 23 Draws & 21 Losses
- 2002 – World Cup – Lost in Semi-Finals – Third Place
- 2003 – Confederations Cup – Third Place
- 2020 – UEFA Euro – Eliminated in the group stage – Finished 24th
Gunes’ most recent run as International manager with Türkiye wasn’t as successful as his first but has the necessary experience with International soccer. Gunes won six trophies as a manager two with Trabzonspor in the mid-1990s and another two with Trabzonspor in 2010 while also winning two trophies over the last eight years with Besiktas.
Louis van Gaal (72) – Advisor with Ajax
41 Wins, 19 Draws & 4 Losses, GF-154, GA-51
Louis_vanGaal
- 2014 – World Cup – Lost in Semi-Finals – Third Place
- 2022 – World Cup – Lost in Quarter-Finals – Fifth Place
At 72 van Gaal’s coaching days might be behind him, however, he did get the Netherlands to the quarter-finals of the 2022 World Cup and lost in penalty kicks to the eventual winner Argentina. Van Gaal also has a very long and successful club coaching career with Ajax, Barcelona, Bayern Munich, and Manchester United where he won 20 trophies.
Luis Enrique – Paris Saint-Germain
26 Wins, 14 Draws & 7 Losses, GF-97, GA-37
- 2020 – UEFA Euro – Lost in Semi-Finals in PKs – Third Place
- 2020–21 – UEFA Nations League – Second Place
- 2022 – World Cup – Lost in Round of 16 in PKs – 13th Place
It was rumored that Enrique was one of the three or four named final candidates for the USMNT in 2023. While Enrique’s International experience is limited he has recently competed in several FIFA tournaments will solid results with Spain. Enrique has also had a very successful club career earning 13 trophies with Paris Saint-Germain and Barcelona.
Next steps for US Soccer and the USMNT
So where does US Soccer go from here? From the sounds of it, leaders inside US Soccer don’t want to part ways with Gregg Berhalter, but I have to wonder why not. Gregg met the expectations of many when the USMNT qualified for the 2022 World Cup and made it out of the group, but in my humble opinion he isn’t able to take this group any further, which is very clear based on recent results against Trinidad and Tobago on the road in Nations League semi-finals, a home Friendly against Colombia and the home lost at Copa America to Panama.
I fear that the USSF will either not fire Gregg Berhalter or fire him and hire another puppet MLS American to run the USMNT, which isn’t what is needed over the next two years if the USMNT is going to make a wanted and needed deep run at the 2026 World Cup.
Who’s a Keeper?
Gregg Berhalter’s Legacy
What’s in a Resume?
-
USMNT6 months agoUSMNT Kits Come in Different Styles and Colors
-
Club News5 years agoJulian Vincente Araujo
-
USMNT4 months agoIs the MLS Specifically Targeting Expansion to USL Cities?
-
USMNT4 years agoA Hidden Gem: Barça Residency Academy
-
MLS2 years ago2022 Youth Series: MLS Club Youth Talent Rankings
-
USMNT2 years agoGROUPED OR GLORY: Group A
-
Youth2 years ago2022 Youth Series: Top 20 Born In 2007
- USMNT5 years ago
MLS Quota
