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USMNT vs Honduras: Chess not Checkers

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Positional Play Scholar

We had a competitive game!  USMNT won 1-0 vs Honduras in the semi-final of the Nations League.  In a fantastic preparation for world qualifiers the super young USMNT got the job done. So why did we leave the game feeling more relieved than excited? 

Summary

The biggest reason (aside from my pre workout red bull that didn’t completely get worked off) was that fans overreacted to some nervy moments. After taking some time away and rewatching the game in detail, I came to the conclusion that the US really dominated that game. A few mistakes made it nervy for fans. US couldn’t finish plays. But when you break it down the US had no problem in build up. They had no problem getting into final third. They had no problem except that last pass or shot. 

This is just one really good example. 

Honduras could do nothing against the US. There were two, maybe three really dangerous opportunities, all self inflicted.  The most dangerous player for Honduras was Ellis. They first tried him in the middle and Brooks aggressively said, “nope.”  They thought he could pick on the “weak” defensive option Dest. Dest manned up 1v1 and laughed.  He rarely even tried Robinson who seemed to have been brought on as a defensive specialist.   

The US did have a few moments that left fans incredulous. The two most obvious were Steffen coming off his line and completely missing the ball on a cross.  It led to Sargent’s best play of the night, a defensive header. (oof).   The second was Dest leaving his man (what felt like) 10 yards behind Brooks- on sides.   Steffen sniffed out the 1v1 fairly easily.  These bloopers aside, Honduras had nothing on their own. By the 60th minute mark while fans were fretting, Honduras knew it and started doing every CONCACAF trick in the book to get the game to penalties.  

Chess Match

The most surprising thing on the rewatch were not individual players, it was the tactics. The US was in their usual 433.

Set up

Tactical matches between coaches is about predicting how the other team will try to attack/ defend you and developing counters.  Ever since the Gold Cup in 2019, when our primary 6 was Michael Bradley, teams focused on man marking the 6.  Depending on how they do that, you can counter that in a few ways. 

Honduras did that with 2 strikers, zonally keeping Yueill out of the game. 

Honduras looked to take out the 6’s ability to be a deep lying playmaker.
It creates a 2v2 in back centrally.

In every game Berhalter depends on a deep lying play maker/ regista to control the tempo of the game and make plays to his attackers from deeper positions. A deep playmaker makes the field bigger.

Defenses want to make the field small and compact.

A deeper playmaker than can hit deeper passes and can stretch the defense both vertically (by playing balls deeper to guys running in behind) and horizontally to spread them wide to create space for combination plays and runners. A deep lying playmaker is crucial to opening up a low block. In the past, Berhalter ran his offense through a 6 as that deep lying playmaker. Mostly notably Michael Bradley

Honduras wanted to take that away. Mexico did it against the US in the GC. Canada did it to the US in first Nations League game. This was expected. It’s not a big deal for anyone that plays with a 6. There is simple tactical adjustment to this. Mexico plays the same way. In the Gold Cup, Berhalter had Mckennie mark their 6 and Tata made the expected adjustment. He dropped an 8 down.

This is why when people say to me the US should just play a 4231, I say not necessarily. The 433 is a very tactically flexible system. The difference in the 433 vs 4231 (or any formation really) is more about personnel selection than shape. This was the obvious adjustment. You can call this a shift to a 4231 if you want or a 433 with one 8 playing closer to the 6 to get number advantages.

Berhalter didn’t do that. Watching the game I was irritated. This was an obvious adjustment. Berhalter was again not adjusting in game. This wasn’t good.

Well I overreacted and was “less right.” (sounds better than flat out wrong).

Berhalter and his staff simply laughed and said JY is not our star player. Throughout the first half they used him as a decoy. Everyone, including myself, were wondering why the 8’s were playing so high. They weren’t just playing high. The whole team were focused on vertical interchange. The tactical adjustment that the US made was not in the form of numbers, they changed their player movement.

They worked to move the opponent with their movement to create space to exploit.

They used the vertical interchanges from deep to open up space in behind Honduras

You see it all through the first half on both sides. People said the midfield didn’t play well. That’s simply false.  They used their movement to open up spaces to attack.  

 

They then had added wrinkles with Reyna and Pulisic routinely cutting inside. Every fast break, you’ll find Reyna and Pulisic inside on the break together.  It was fantastic, the way they planned to get these two 10’s in the right spaces to work together on the counter. It was largely built off these vertical interchanges. 

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Consistently, they had Reyna and Pulisic cut inside off of these vertical interchanges. They used the forward movement of the cms, to create space for them to attack.  This was best seen on fast breaks and quick transitions. 

Why?

So why? Why did the US focus on these vertical interchanges instead of the simple adaption of dropping a deeper 8? That’s the chess match. In checkers, you think one move ahead. In Chess, you think two (or many more) moves head. The current Us coaching staff may not be good at checkers but they are excellent at chess.

What would be the reaction by Honduras if the US dropped the 8? We don’t have to guess. Honduras adapted to the vertical interchanges by half time and the US were getting fewer chances with their movments. At half time, the the US dropped their 8’s.

By the second half, the US were getting fewer opportunities with the vertical interchanges. So they played closer and dropped their 8’s to make progression easier.

The result was Honduras in a deep block much of the second half.  This was why Yueill seemed better and calmer. (he still had a bad game as a whole).  It’s why the US started getting deeper as a team into Honduras final third. 

 

One of the hardest things to do is break down a deep block.  This season Jorginho scored an own goal against Arsenal.  Chelsea spent the whole game trying to beat a deep block.   One reason the 3 in the back is more popular is that teams are using their CB’s more as passing playmakers.  Brooks was that again and again and again against Honduras.  By design.  Throughout the first half, Jackson Yeuill occupied two attackers high up the pitch and allowed Brooks to pick them apart from deep. 

If they had gone early to dropping the 8’s, Honduras would have spent a lot more time in the low block. We would have had to push numbers forwards to break it down and spent a lot more time vulnerable to the counter. 

The US intentionally kept Honduras from falling into that low block for the first half by making plays and runs from deeper.  They opened several opportunities throughout first half. Then when Honduras stopped biting on the midfield movement, the US adapted by dropping the 8’s and pushing numbers forward.

Late Game adjustments

At the end of the game with the game still tied 0-0 and Honduras mostly in the low block, the US made further adjustments. These are the best in game adjustments I’ve seen from Berhalter since he became the US coach.

Siebatcheu for Sargent because Sargent was horrible. I’ll try to get into that in a later article.

Acosta for Yuiell because Yueill was also very bad. JY was not bad for the reasons most think though. In short he wasn’t bad because he’s not press resistant or because of his technique. His technique was as good as most on the US (who were oddly bad all game) and the US doesn’t ask their 6 to be press resistant. If they get in a situation where they have to be- something went wrong. I’ll try address that later. For now- he was bad because of these.

He saw it and didn’t hit it.
He saw it and didn’t hit it
He chose the blue with all of those options. This was the worst moment of the game for him for me.

When the game was on the line, Berhalter couldn’t trust Yueill to hit the pass. He hit some. It wasn’t all bad but in the last 10 minutes it became crucial that Yueill not play tentative with his passing. So he added Acosta for better range and cover and moved Brooks higher for his DLP skills.

Also huge – for me was Cannon for Robinson. These adjustments drove fans crazy. They want, badly, dynamic impact subs that an do something different. Berhalter and his staff are more likely to change how they want to attack the defense than hope on a supersub.

In this case, they moved Dest to left. This is something I was hoping to see. I’ve said before that the understanding of space and movement is superior by our two best players which currently are Pulisic and Dest. Reyna is a fantastic talent who mostly had a very good game. He’s just not to their level of understanding of those things yet. He’s much better than he was. He did a much better job of both cutting into the halfspace and going wide.

This is a classic zonal interchange that we’ve seen since 2019. Very slick movement by Mckennie to pull two defenders to the wide zone. Mckennie goes wide and Reyna goes to the halfspace slot.  Great read and run of Reyna to the space and nice pass slotted into that space.  This suits Reyna who I’ve said has a magnet attached to him and the goal. This is more of the “system” at work.

He’s not as good wide though and his instincts to go to goal can get a little predictable. 

By adding Cannon and moving Dest to the left, they get these types of things more often. They get better overloads on the left that open up space on the right. As Honduras fell back into a deep block, they needed more zonal fluidity on both sides but particularly left;.  They needed more than every to spread out Honduras or  they would have to start relying on deep crosses which rarely end well.. just ask Chelsea. 

They wanted to use the combination of Dest and Pulisic’s ball skills and their understanding of movement and space to interchange, combine and pry that full back away.

https://twitter.com/goal/status/1375150195181285393?s=20

Similar to this- though this was an overlap.  Honduras were doubling Pulisic all game. With Dest and Pulisic together that becomes increasingly difficult to do AND keep defensive integrity across the back four. 

Then you get this. 

https://twitter.com/BleacherReport/status/1400627001313042433?s=20

 

Overload of 1v1 talent on the left created a 1v1 with Weston Mckennie and a free man in Cannon. Wes beats his man and it’s a goal. 

He brought in Cannon to overload the left. He brought in Acosta to push Brooks up for his DLP skills and he brought in Siebatcheu to get better finishing. 

Check Mate.   

Concerns

The biggest concern I have is not Jackson Yueil to most fans chagrin. He was mostly a non-factor for me. My biggest concern is related though. My biggest concern is the over reliance on John Brooks. Without Brooks we don’t win that game. We don’t even get half the chances we got and are a lot less dominant.

Mckenzie was pretty poor in deep distribution. He didn’t hit the passes necessary but mostly he didn’t see or try them when they were there. It was not the plan during the vertical interchange to only focus on Brooks. It happened that way because he was the only one that could consistently play the pass.

Best example though there are others.

Sargent is not finishing chances. The below was the worst for me. He finally loses his defender. How does our top striker prospect not beat the cb there?  Mount beat Pique in a championship final but our #1 striker prospect can’t beat a Honduras defender. And if you look closely, it looks to me like he just whiffs. Sargent simply wasn’t finishing chances.  He got a fantastic ball from Robinson and puts in right at the keeper.  I think this is a concern.

We need more players than Brooks to unlock teams from deep and we need a 9 who can score.  I would be surprised at this point if Sargent starts next game and I’m concerned with what Tata will come up with to shut down Brooks.  I expect Adams back at the 6. He was on the bench this game and I think they’ve been saving him and Musah for Mexico. 

The positive side is Berhalter and his staff planned an excellent game against Honduras.  They adapted well.  Despite some poor finishing and lots of wtf play from just about every player on the field, the US dominated.  Most optimistic take away from this game was that the coaches got the tactics right from the start and made pin point adjustments throughout. Those adjustments were huge in winning the game. Let’s hope they can do that vs Mexico. 

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Side by Side: The Looking at USMNT Center Back Pairings – Past & Present

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If the March 2026 window revealed anything about the United States men’s national soccer team, it’s that their center-back group, whether in a two- or three-man setup, lacks cohesion heading into the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The partnership, continuity, and communication between center backs are critical to organizing the entire defense, and right now, that foundation doesn’t look fully settled.

That realization prompted a look back over the past 40 years, examining the different center-back pairings, how they developed chemistry, and the impact those partnerships had on the USMNT at the highest level.

The Steadfast Anchor of the 1990 USMNT Defense

Mike Windischmann, captain of the 1990 USMNT World Cup team, was a cornerstone of the squad throughout the 1990 cycle. For much of that period, he was paired at center-back with Steve Trittschuh, though the two didn’t start together at the World Cup itself. Windischmann also formed defensive partnerships with John Doyle, Marcelo Balboa, and Paul Caligiuri at various points. At the World Cup, he teamed up with Jimmy Banks in two of the three matches, providing leadership and stability at the heart of the U.S. backline.

Trailblazers Building a Solid Back Line for the Future

Much like the 1990 cycle, Marcelo Balboa was a constant presence on the USMNT back line, whether playing as a sweeper under Bora Milutinović or in a back three with six midfielders in front of him under Steve Sampson. He formed key partnerships with emerging talents like Alexi Lalas, who joined the team in 1992, and dual-national Thomas Dooley. This defensive core enjoyed significant successes throughout the 1994 and 1998 cycles, including advancing out of the group stage at the 1994 World Cup, defeating Argentina at the 1995 Copa América, and taking Brazil to the brink in a hard-fought semifinal.

A Defensive Anchor in U.S. Soccer History

Widely regarded as one of the top center-backs in U.S. men’s national team history, Eddie Pope featured in three consecutive FIFA World Cups (1998, 2002, and 2006), starting in all three for the USMNT. At the 2002 tournament, he anchored a formidable back line alongside Tony Sanneh and Jeff Agoos, forming a disciplined and resilient defensive unit for the United States men’s national soccer team. That group played a key role in one of the program’s deepest modern World Cup runs, but does it stand as the best defensive unit the USMNT has ever produced?

A Peak Partnership Interrupted

For me, one of the strongest center-back pairings in United States men’s national soccer team history emerged during the 2010 cycle, anchored by Carlos Bocanegra and Oguchi Onyewu. The duo arguably reached their peak at the 2009 Confederations Cup, forming a physically dominant and well-organized backbone.

Unfortunately, Onyewu’s injury leading into the 2010 World Cup limited his effectiveness, preventing the partnership from carrying that same level into the tournament. In his absence, Jay DeMerit stepped in seamlessly, providing valuable depth and steady performances, highlighting the overall strength of the USMNT’s center-back pool during that period.

From Breakthrough to Breakdown

The center-back pairing of Omar Gonzalez and Matt Besler came together late in the 2014 cycle but quickly developed into a reliable and cohesive duo at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Their understanding and physical presence helped stabilize the back line on the world stage.

That tournament also introduced a rising presence in John Brooks, who memorably scored the game-winning goal against Ghana after Besler picked up a knock, announcing himself in a major moment.

As the cycle turned toward 2018, Brooks continued to establish himself, often partnering with Geoff Cameron, while Gonzalez and Besler remained in the mix depending on form and fitness. However, as the 2018 cycle progressed, inconsistency and a lack of cohesion among the center-backs became an issue, one of several factors that ultimately contributed to the United States men’s national soccer team failing to qualify for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.

Emerging Stability Ahead of the 2022 World Cup

Heading into the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the United States men’s national soccer team faced real uncertainty at center back, with no clear anchor or leader emerging. That quickly changed, as Tim Ream stepped in and solidified himself as the steadying presence of the back line.

A major turning point came when Miles Robinson suffered a ruptured Achilles tendon in the summer leading up to the tournament—a significant blow given his form and importance to the group. His absence opened the door for Walker Zimmerman, who had already been in contention, to establish a strong partnership alongside Ream.

Meanwhile, Aaron Long, returning from his own Achilles injury in 2021, earned a place on the roster, and Cameron Carter-Vickers also featured, with both players contributing minutes during the tournament. Together, this group brought stability to a position that had looked unsettled just months earlier.

2026 at Center Back Uncertainty and Opportunity

There are more questions than answers surrounding the United States men’s national soccer team center-back picture heading into the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Chris Richards appears to be a near lock, while Tim Ream, though still a trusted presence, has shown signs of decline compared to four years ago, yet could still find his way onto the roster based on experience and leadership.

A key variable will be how Mauricio Pochettino sets up tactically, particularly whether he opts for a two or three center-back system. In a back three, players like Joe Scally and Alex Freeman could slide into right center-back roles given their versatility, while Mark McKenzie and Auston Trusty provide options on the left. Miles Robinson also remains firmly in the mix as competition for a roster spot.

Perhaps the biggest unknown is Noahkai Banks. The 19-year-old dual national, currently playing in the Bundesliga, opted out of a recent USMNT camp while weighing his international future between the United States and Germany. If he ultimately commits, his emergence could significantly impact the depth and ceiling of the USMNT’s center-back pool heading into 2026.

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Voices of USMNT on the World Stage

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Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)

Over the decades, the United States Men’s National Soccer Team has been accompanied by a wide range of voices behind the microphone, delivering some of the most memorable calls in World Cup history.

Along the way, several standout broadcast duos have helped shape the viewing experience and left a lasting mark on the USMNT landscape.

Here’s a look back at the voices that have defined US World Cup broadcasts since 1990.

1990 FIFA World Cup – Italy 

Network: ESPN

Play-by-play: Bob Ley

Color: Paul Gardner

Coverage of the USMNT at the 1990 World Cup was limited, particularly in the early rounds, but Bob Ley emerged as one of the defining voices of soccer on U.S. television during that era. His presence helped introduce a new generation of American fans to the international game, providing context and credibility at a time when the global stage still felt unfamiliar to much of the US audience.

1994 FIFA World Cup – United States of America

1998 FIFA World Cup – France

2002 FIFA World Cup – Japan / South Korea

Networks: ABC / ESPN

Play-by-play: JP Dellacamera

Color: Ty Keough

This play-by-play and color commentary duo called three World Cups for the USMNT, becoming the defining voice of the team during my peak viewing years. Ty Keough the former USMNT midfielder from the late 1970s and early 1980s.

JP Dellacamera stands out as one of, if not the, best play-by-play announcers and remains one of my favorites. While others on this list delivered memorable moments, they didn’t quite match that same level of longevity.

2006 FIFA World Cup – Germany 

Networks: ABC / ESPN

Play-by-play: Dave O’Brien

Color: Marcelo Balboa

New England native Dave O’Brien, widely known today for calling major sports across his career, had just one World Cup as the primary play-by-play voice for the USMNT. His run calling USMNT matches, primarily in the mid-2000s on ESPN, was relatively brief but still memorable. While he isn’t as closely associated with the USMNT as some other broadcasters, he was behind the mic for several standout moments during that era.

2010 FIFA World Cup – South Korea

Network: ESPN

Play-by-play: Ian Darke

Color: John Harkes

Ian Darke brought a global voice to American audiences as the lead play-by-play announcer for the USMNT during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Already well known around the world, he made the tournament easy to connect with for U.S. fans and delivered one of the most iconic calls in American soccer history.

Darke’s iconic call of the USMNT game winning goal by Landon Donovan in must win final group stage match against Algeria to advance to the knockout stage of the 2010 World Cup gives me chills every time I see it.

2014 FIFA World Cup – Brazil 

Networks: ESPN / ABC

Play-by-play: Ian Darke

Color: Taylor Twellman

This duo might be my favorite to date. Ian Darke brought a clear, global voice to USMNT viewers during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, making the tournament easy to follow for US fans while elevating the biggest moments with calm, sharp, and memorable calls.

Alongside him, Taylor Twellman emerged as one of the most recognizable and influential voices of the modern era, primarily as a lead analyst on ESPN. His passionate, unfiltered style stood out, most notably with his unforgettable “What are we doing?!” reaction following the USMNT’s failure to qualify for the 2018 World Cup, a moment that’s still talked about today.

2022 FIFA World Cup – Qatar

Network: FOX Sports

Play-by-play: John Strong

Color: Stu Holden

If the USMNT had qualified for the 2018 World Cup, this broadcast team would have called their matches, marking what would have been a third straight World Cup cycle with the same primary commentary crew. It’s also likely he’ll be paired again with Stu Holden for USMNT matches at the 2026 World Cup.

John Strong has served as a lead play-by-play voice for U.S. soccer on FOX Sports since 2018, bringing a modern, high-energy style to the booth. Since taking on major international assignments, he’s become one of the defining voices for USMNT audiences in top competitions, known for his clear, sharp calls and a big-game tone that fits the moment.

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The Expanding Impact of MLS on the World Cup

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The growth and success of Major League Soccer has led to more players from around the world representing MLS at the World Cup, with this summer’s tournament expected to feature the highest total yet.

1998 was the first World Cup played after the launch of Major League Soccer. Here’s a breakdown of MLS-based players on World Cup rosters by year:

1998 – 18 (T-8th)
Tied with Liga MX for 8th most. This would the first and only time the USMNT World Cup roster  

2002 – 11 (18th)
All 11 were from the USMNT

2006 – 15 (14th)
11 of the 15 were #USMNT players.

2010 – 6 (25th)
The lowest total to date. Only 6 MLS players, with 4 on the USMNT. This coincided with the peak of US players based in Europe.

2014 – 21 (10th)
Less than half were USMNT players, though the US still led the way the 10 most notably DeAndre Yedlin (20) getting the call.

2018 – 18 (11th)
This number likely would’ve been significantly higher had the USMNT qualified, potentially pushing MLS into the top 7–8 leagues.

2022 – 36 (6th)
The highest total yet, just behind Ligue 1 for 5th. Also worth noting, rosters expanded from 23 to 26 players for this tournament and the first time that the USA didn’t have the most players 

Overall, the trend shows steady growth in MLS representation, both domestically and internationally.

MLS Pipeline Continues for the USMNT

It’s rare for a World Cup–qualified nation not to have a strong share of its players featured across tournament rosters. Canada was a recent exception in 2022, though their ties to MLS remain significant with multiple clubs in the league.

With roster selection less than a month away, it’s reasonable to expect that roughly a third of the #USMNT squad will come from MLS. Below is a positional breakdown of the MLS players Mauricio Pochettino has called in during his tenure as USMNT manager.

Goalkeepers

The USMNT is set to start an MLS-based goalkeeper at a World Cup for the first time, with all of the top options currently playing in MLS.

Chris Brady is one of the goalkeepers I’m most excited to watch in the coming cycles. He’s been performing at a high level in Major League Soccer and looks like a strong candidate to fill the long-term role as the USMNT’s primary starter over the next few cycles.

Chris Brady
Roman Celentano
Matt Freese
Patrick Schulte
Matt Turner

Defenders

Veteran center-backs Tim Ream and Miles Robinson seem likely to be selected with Blackmon a possibility depending on the health of the remaining pool. Arfsten seems to be almost a lock due to his ability to attack and create scoring chances with his crosses from the wing.

Max Arfsten
Tristan Blackmon
Tim Ream
Miles Robinson

Midfielders

The USMNT has strong depth in midfield, and Mauricio Pochettino’s recent roster selections suggest he’ll likely round out the squad with some of the players listed below.

One of the biggest gaps in this USMNT roster is the true dynamic, creative spark in the attacking third. Diego Luna stands out in that role, capable of unsettling defenses, breaking lines, and changing the rhythm of a match. He’s exactly the type of player who could thrive in a super-sub role, coming on against tired legs and making an impact at this summer’s World Cup.

Sebastian Berhalter
Diego Luna
Jack McGlynn
Cristian Roldan
Timothy Tillman

Forwards

Striker may be the toughest position for the MLS group to crack the #USMNT World Cup roster, but Brian White is making a strong case, scoring eight goals in his first nine MLS matches at the time of writing.

Brian White is a highly productive, “old-school” style striker for the USMNT, known for his elite positioning, relentless work rate, and ability to finish in a variety of ways. That combination makes him a strong option as a striker off the bench, where he could be especially dangerous against tired defenses at this summer’s World Cup.

Paxten Aaronson
Josh Sargent
Brian White

MLS Representation in the USMNT Player Pool

Since 1998, the last time the majority of a USMNT World Cup roster was composed primarily of MLS-based players, it has become increasingly clear that a meaningful portion of the squad still comes from MLS. Consistently, roughly 30–40% of the roster has been drawn from the domestic league, reflecting a long-standing and relatively stable trend in player selection over time which I don’t seen changing anytime soon.

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