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USMNT vs Honduras: Chess not Checkers

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Positional Play Scholar

We had a competitive game!  USMNT won 1-0 vs Honduras in the semi-final of the Nations League.  In a fantastic preparation for world qualifiers the super young USMNT got the job done. So why did we leave the game feeling more relieved than excited? 

Summary

The biggest reason (aside from my pre workout red bull that didn’t completely get worked off) was that fans overreacted to some nervy moments. After taking some time away and rewatching the game in detail, I came to the conclusion that the US really dominated that game. A few mistakes made it nervy for fans. US couldn’t finish plays. But when you break it down the US had no problem in build up. They had no problem getting into final third. They had no problem except that last pass or shot. 

This is just one really good example. 

Honduras could do nothing against the US. There were two, maybe three really dangerous opportunities, all self inflicted.  The most dangerous player for Honduras was Ellis. They first tried him in the middle and Brooks aggressively said, “nope.”  They thought he could pick on the “weak” defensive option Dest. Dest manned up 1v1 and laughed.  He rarely even tried Robinson who seemed to have been brought on as a defensive specialist.   

The US did have a few moments that left fans incredulous. The two most obvious were Steffen coming off his line and completely missing the ball on a cross.  It led to Sargent’s best play of the night, a defensive header. (oof).   The second was Dest leaving his man (what felt like) 10 yards behind Brooks- on sides.   Steffen sniffed out the 1v1 fairly easily.  These bloopers aside, Honduras had nothing on their own. By the 60th minute mark while fans were fretting, Honduras knew it and started doing every CONCACAF trick in the book to get the game to penalties.  

Chess Match

The most surprising thing on the rewatch were not individual players, it was the tactics. The US was in their usual 433.

Set up

Tactical matches between coaches is about predicting how the other team will try to attack/ defend you and developing counters.  Ever since the Gold Cup in 2019, when our primary 6 was Michael Bradley, teams focused on man marking the 6.  Depending on how they do that, you can counter that in a few ways. 

Honduras did that with 2 strikers, zonally keeping Yueill out of the game. 

Honduras looked to take out the 6’s ability to be a deep lying playmaker.
It creates a 2v2 in back centrally.

In every game Berhalter depends on a deep lying play maker/ regista to control the tempo of the game and make plays to his attackers from deeper positions. A deep playmaker makes the field bigger.

Defenses want to make the field small and compact.

A deeper playmaker than can hit deeper passes and can stretch the defense both vertically (by playing balls deeper to guys running in behind) and horizontally to spread them wide to create space for combination plays and runners. A deep lying playmaker is crucial to opening up a low block. In the past, Berhalter ran his offense through a 6 as that deep lying playmaker. Mostly notably Michael Bradley

Honduras wanted to take that away. Mexico did it against the US in the GC. Canada did it to the US in first Nations League game. This was expected. It’s not a big deal for anyone that plays with a 6. There is simple tactical adjustment to this. Mexico plays the same way. In the Gold Cup, Berhalter had Mckennie mark their 6 and Tata made the expected adjustment. He dropped an 8 down.

This is why when people say to me the US should just play a 4231, I say not necessarily. The 433 is a very tactically flexible system. The difference in the 433 vs 4231 (or any formation really) is more about personnel selection than shape. This was the obvious adjustment. You can call this a shift to a 4231 if you want or a 433 with one 8 playing closer to the 6 to get number advantages.

Berhalter didn’t do that. Watching the game I was irritated. This was an obvious adjustment. Berhalter was again not adjusting in game. This wasn’t good.

Well I overreacted and was “less right.” (sounds better than flat out wrong).

Berhalter and his staff simply laughed and said JY is not our star player. Throughout the first half they used him as a decoy. Everyone, including myself, were wondering why the 8’s were playing so high. They weren’t just playing high. The whole team were focused on vertical interchange. The tactical adjustment that the US made was not in the form of numbers, they changed their player movement.

They worked to move the opponent with their movement to create space to exploit.

They used the vertical interchanges from deep to open up space in behind Honduras

You see it all through the first half on both sides. People said the midfield didn’t play well. That’s simply false.  They used their movement to open up spaces to attack.  

 

They then had added wrinkles with Reyna and Pulisic routinely cutting inside. Every fast break, you’ll find Reyna and Pulisic inside on the break together.  It was fantastic, the way they planned to get these two 10’s in the right spaces to work together on the counter. It was largely built off these vertical interchanges. 

,

Consistently, they had Reyna and Pulisic cut inside off of these vertical interchanges. They used the forward movement of the cms, to create space for them to attack.  This was best seen on fast breaks and quick transitions. 

Why?

So why? Why did the US focus on these vertical interchanges instead of the simple adaption of dropping a deeper 8? That’s the chess match. In checkers, you think one move ahead. In Chess, you think two (or many more) moves head. The current Us coaching staff may not be good at checkers but they are excellent at chess.

What would be the reaction by Honduras if the US dropped the 8? We don’t have to guess. Honduras adapted to the vertical interchanges by half time and the US were getting fewer chances with their movments. At half time, the the US dropped their 8’s.

By the second half, the US were getting fewer opportunities with the vertical interchanges. So they played closer and dropped their 8’s to make progression easier.

The result was Honduras in a deep block much of the second half.  This was why Yueill seemed better and calmer. (he still had a bad game as a whole).  It’s why the US started getting deeper as a team into Honduras final third. 

 

One of the hardest things to do is break down a deep block.  This season Jorginho scored an own goal against Arsenal.  Chelsea spent the whole game trying to beat a deep block.   One reason the 3 in the back is more popular is that teams are using their CB’s more as passing playmakers.  Brooks was that again and again and again against Honduras.  By design.  Throughout the first half, Jackson Yeuill occupied two attackers high up the pitch and allowed Brooks to pick them apart from deep. 

If they had gone early to dropping the 8’s, Honduras would have spent a lot more time in the low block. We would have had to push numbers forwards to break it down and spent a lot more time vulnerable to the counter. 

The US intentionally kept Honduras from falling into that low block for the first half by making plays and runs from deeper.  They opened several opportunities throughout first half. Then when Honduras stopped biting on the midfield movement, the US adapted by dropping the 8’s and pushing numbers forward.

Late Game adjustments

At the end of the game with the game still tied 0-0 and Honduras mostly in the low block, the US made further adjustments. These are the best in game adjustments I’ve seen from Berhalter since he became the US coach.

Siebatcheu for Sargent because Sargent was horrible. I’ll try to get into that in a later article.

Acosta for Yuiell because Yueill was also very bad. JY was not bad for the reasons most think though. In short he wasn’t bad because he’s not press resistant or because of his technique. His technique was as good as most on the US (who were oddly bad all game) and the US doesn’t ask their 6 to be press resistant. If they get in a situation where they have to be- something went wrong. I’ll try address that later. For now- he was bad because of these.

He saw it and didn’t hit it.
He saw it and didn’t hit it
He chose the blue with all of those options. This was the worst moment of the game for him for me.

When the game was on the line, Berhalter couldn’t trust Yueill to hit the pass. He hit some. It wasn’t all bad but in the last 10 minutes it became crucial that Yueill not play tentative with his passing. So he added Acosta for better range and cover and moved Brooks higher for his DLP skills.

Also huge – for me was Cannon for Robinson. These adjustments drove fans crazy. They want, badly, dynamic impact subs that an do something different. Berhalter and his staff are more likely to change how they want to attack the defense than hope on a supersub.

In this case, they moved Dest to left. This is something I was hoping to see. I’ve said before that the understanding of space and movement is superior by our two best players which currently are Pulisic and Dest. Reyna is a fantastic talent who mostly had a very good game. He’s just not to their level of understanding of those things yet. He’s much better than he was. He did a much better job of both cutting into the halfspace and going wide.

This is a classic zonal interchange that we’ve seen since 2019. Very slick movement by Mckennie to pull two defenders to the wide zone. Mckennie goes wide and Reyna goes to the halfspace slot.  Great read and run of Reyna to the space and nice pass slotted into that space.  This suits Reyna who I’ve said has a magnet attached to him and the goal. This is more of the “system” at work.

He’s not as good wide though and his instincts to go to goal can get a little predictable. 

By adding Cannon and moving Dest to the left, they get these types of things more often. They get better overloads on the left that open up space on the right. As Honduras fell back into a deep block, they needed more zonal fluidity on both sides but particularly left;.  They needed more than every to spread out Honduras or  they would have to start relying on deep crosses which rarely end well.. just ask Chelsea. 

They wanted to use the combination of Dest and Pulisic’s ball skills and their understanding of movement and space to interchange, combine and pry that full back away.

https://twitter.com/goal/status/1375150195181285393?s=20

Similar to this- though this was an overlap.  Honduras were doubling Pulisic all game. With Dest and Pulisic together that becomes increasingly difficult to do AND keep defensive integrity across the back four. 

Then you get this. 

https://twitter.com/BleacherReport/status/1400627001313042433?s=20

 

Overload of 1v1 talent on the left created a 1v1 with Weston Mckennie and a free man in Cannon. Wes beats his man and it’s a goal. 

He brought in Cannon to overload the left. He brought in Acosta to push Brooks up for his DLP skills and he brought in Siebatcheu to get better finishing. 

Check Mate.   

Concerns

The biggest concern I have is not Jackson Yueil to most fans chagrin. He was mostly a non-factor for me. My biggest concern is related though. My biggest concern is the over reliance on John Brooks. Without Brooks we don’t win that game. We don’t even get half the chances we got and are a lot less dominant.

Mckenzie was pretty poor in deep distribution. He didn’t hit the passes necessary but mostly he didn’t see or try them when they were there. It was not the plan during the vertical interchange to only focus on Brooks. It happened that way because he was the only one that could consistently play the pass.

Best example though there are others.

Sargent is not finishing chances. The below was the worst for me. He finally loses his defender. How does our top striker prospect not beat the cb there?  Mount beat Pique in a championship final but our #1 striker prospect can’t beat a Honduras defender. And if you look closely, it looks to me like he just whiffs. Sargent simply wasn’t finishing chances.  He got a fantastic ball from Robinson and puts in right at the keeper.  I think this is a concern.

We need more players than Brooks to unlock teams from deep and we need a 9 who can score.  I would be surprised at this point if Sargent starts next game and I’m concerned with what Tata will come up with to shut down Brooks.  I expect Adams back at the 6. He was on the bench this game and I think they’ve been saving him and Musah for Mexico. 

The positive side is Berhalter and his staff planned an excellent game against Honduras.  They adapted well.  Despite some poor finishing and lots of wtf play from just about every player on the field, the US dominated.  Most optimistic take away from this game was that the coaches got the tactics right from the start and made pin point adjustments throughout. Those adjustments were huge in winning the game. Let’s hope they can do that vs Mexico. 

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The More Things Change, The More They Remain the Same

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Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)

In light of the recent resignation of Matt Crocker, I revisited something I wrote nearly a decade ago, an early attempt to capture what I called the “Dark Decades of US Soccer.” At the time, the piece was overly long and packed with detail—probably more than today’s audience would stick with.

But buried in that work were meaningful patterns, clear, recurring behaviors that shaped how the federation operated more than 60 years ago. What stood out most, looking back now, is how familiar some of those patterns still feel today.

So, I went back, stripped the piece down, and pulled out the most relevant sections, those that highlight the parallels between past and present. The goal isn’t to draw conclusions for you, but to put those similarities side by side and let you decide: how much has really changed?

World Cup Momentum to the First American Soccer Boom

Soccer star Pele in action during World Cup competition.

Photo of Pele at the 1966 World Cup
Photograph: AP Photo

After the success and popularity of the 1966 World Cup which saw over one million viewers of the tournament many America investors saw the vision and believed that there was the market for soccer in the United States and Canada

The investors moved very quickly and in 1967 there were two American professional leagues making their debuts the USSFA-sanctioned United Soccer Association (USA) and the independent National Professional Soccer League (NPSL).  

These leagues would only last one year and be merged at the request of FIFA into the North American Soccer League (NASL) kicking off in 1968 and relying on mainly on foreign talent. The American investors believed building the interest in soccer in the US would have a direct impact on the growth and performance of the US Men’s National team which and of course more money for the investors and federation.

First Attempt at Modernizing the USMNT

Phil Woosnam, in 1977 as the commissioner of the NASL.
Photograph: AP Photo

Off the back of the success of the inaugural NASL season, the U.S. Soccer Federation appointed Phil Woosnam, fresh off leading the Atlanta Chiefs to a championship and earning Coach of the Year honors, to take charge of the U.S. Men’s National Team.

Woosnam immediately shifted the structure of the program. Instead of a player pool selected by committee, he pushed decision-making toward the coaching staff, allowing selections to be based on performance and fit rather than geography or internal bias. The move was not universally welcomed, and it reportedly created friction with members of the federation’s leadership.

With professional players now more fully available, Woosnam’s approach helped assemble what was widely considered the strongest possible squad at the time. He also introduced organized training camps ahead of friendlies and World Cup qualifiers, an uncommon practice in that era, but one that clearly improved cohesion and preparation. Those changes contributed to the U.S. advancing further in World Cup qualifying than it had in previous cycles.

By early 1969, the USMNT appeared to be building real momentum toward a potential place in the 1970 World Cup. However, tensions between Woosnam and the federation began to escalate. Frustrated with compensation issues and growing interference from the USSF in team operations, Woosnam stepped away from the national team in the spring of 1969. become commissioner of the NASL.

Following his departure, assistant coach Gordon Jago took over as manager. His tenure began under difficult circumstances, with not being able to set up pre-qualifying friendlies, an important part of the progress made under Woosnam along with interference from USSF board members as it related to roster selection which created instability and morale issues on the field. The USMNT struggled in qualifying and ultimately fell short, losing both matches to Haiti, a team they had previously been competitive with in a series of friendlies in 1968.

The Crocker Era: Coaching Chaos and Course Corrections

Photo of Cindy Parlow Cone, Gregg Berhalter, Matt Crocker and JT Batson
Photograph: AP Photo/Lucas Peliter

It’s been roughly three years since the Matt Crocker era began at U.S. Soccer, when he stepped in as Sporting Director, replacing Earnie Stewart.

One of Crocker’s first major responsibilities was hiring the next U.S. Men’s National Team manager. In the previous cycle, the federation had reportedly operated with a narrow set of internal criteria, preferences widely believed to favor English-speaking and American candidates, which significantly limited the coaching pool and shaped the direction of the search.

Roughly two months later, during the Concacaf Nations League semifinal window, it was announced that Gregg Berhalter would be reappointed as USMNT head coach. The decision caught many around the program and in the media off guard, raising questions about how the process had ultimately unfolded.

More recently, in an interview with GiveMeSport, Jesse Marsch stated he was effectively told he was set to become the next USMNT head coach in the late spring of 2023, only for that opportunity to be withdrawn at the last moment, a shift that reportedly had ripple effects on a potential move to Leicester City that was nearing completion.

The abrupt reversal and eventual rehiring of Berhalter has been widely attributed to a mix of factors, including rumored influence from within the player pool, with U.S. Soccer ultimately reversing course. Roughly a year later, after a disappointing Copa América campaign on home soil, Berhalter was dismissed.

Crocker’s second opportunity to reset the program took a different direction. He first secured the high-profile appointment of Emma Hayes, one of the most accomplished managers in women’s football, to lead the USWNT. That move was followed by the hiring of Mauricio Pochettino for the USMNT, a tenure that has delivered mixed early results and will ultimately be judged through the lens of the 2026 World Cup on home soil but truly disappointed that Crocker wouldn’t see through what he helped build, and you have to ask yourself why?

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The No. 9 Timeline: A Historical Look at USMNT Strikers

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Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)

Each generation of soccer can be understood through overlapping eras, each one feeding into the next. Some produce deeper pools of talent, while others rely on a handful of standout players. In a recent piece, I looked back at past USMNT goalkeepers and their impact on World Cup teams. That led to a natural follow-up: a deeper dive into the history of USMNT strikers.

For this article, I’ve divided that history into three distinct eras, focusing strictly on past strikers rather than the current pool. I’ll wrap up, however, with some thoughts on where today’s active strikers fit into that broader timeline. For each era I will spotlight four strikers.

According to their media guide, the modern era of the USMNT begins with the 1990 World Cup cycle. While that framing makes some sense, it does gloss over some of the program’s more challenging decades. For the purposes of this, though, we’ll start there as well, especially considering that from 1974 to 1986, the USMNT averaged fewer than 20 matches per cycle and scored less than a goal per game across those four cycles.

Trailblazers: The Early Era of USMNT Strikers

The story of USMNT strikers stretches back nearly 40 years, to a time when goals were often hard to come by, but a handful of players still managed to leave a lasting impression. This was an era defined less by consistent production and more by moments, flashes of quality that stood out during a formative period for the program.

Players like Chris Sullivan, Eric Eichmann, Frank Klopas, and Roy Wegerle all played roles in at least one World Cup cycle and delivered important goals along the way. However, consistency and longevity at the international level proved elusive, reflecting the broader challenges the USMNT faced during this period.

Even so, these players helped lay the groundwork for future generations, establishing the foundation for what the striker position would eventually become.


Bruce Murray (1985 – 1993)
85 Caps, 21 goals, 11 assists

A quick, opportunistic forward known for his movement and ability to capitalize on chances, Bruce Murray was the type of striker the USMNT hadn’t truly seen before. He filled that role throughout the 1990 cycle and into the lead-up to 1994, emerging as the team’s leading scorer during that stretch and helping guide the U.S. to its first World Cup appearance since 1950. At the 1990 World Cup, Murray contributed a goal and an assist, highlighting his impact on the international stage.

Despite his contributions, Murray was ultimately left off the 1994 World Cup squad, one of the final cuts as the program began to turn toward younger options and players competing in Europe at the time.

Eric Wynalda (1990 – 2000)
106 Caps, 34 goals, 17 assists

The premier striker of this era for the USMNT, Eric Wynalda featured in three consecutive World Cups. A dynamic and confident forward, he combined technical ability with a powerful shot, making him a constant goal threat and the focal point of the U.S. attack.

His iconic set-piece goal against Switzerland in the USMNT’s opening match of the 1994 FIFA World Cup remains one of the greatest in tournament history and stands among the best goals ever scored by the USMNT. Wynalda not only delivered in defining moments but also set the tone and standard for the strikers who followed.

Earnie Stewart (1990 – 2004)
101 Caps, 17 goals, 10 assists

Earnie Stewart was a key attacking figure for the USMNT throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, bringing a blend of technical quality, intelligence, and consistency to the squad. Comfortable as both a striker and a second forward, his versatility allowed him to influence matches in multiple ways while effectively linking midfield and attack.

While not a traditional No. 9, Stewart’s movement, awareness, and all-around contributions helped shape the evolution of the USMNT’s forward line during a critical period of growth for the program. He appeared in three World Cups—the 1994 FIFA World Cup, 1998 FIFA World Cup, and 2002 FIFA World Cup—and delivered one of the most iconic moments in U.S. soccer history, scoring the game-winning goal against heavily favored Colombia on home soil in 1994.

Second Generation USMNT Strikers (1996-2010)

The next era of USMNT strikers following the 1994 World Cup produced a tough, hard-nosed group. Several featured in one or more World Cup cycles, led by Josh Wolff, who made both the 2002 and 2006 squads.

Brian Ching and Eddie Johnson were also key figures, earning spots on the 2006 roster, with some arguing they were overlooked later in their careers. Other notable names from that period include Casey Coner, Ante Razov, and Taylor Twellman, players who all had opportunities with the USMNT, but whose form and timing didn’t quite align with World Cup selection. Twellman, in particular, still believes he should have been part of the 2006 squad.

Joe-Max Moore (1992 – 2002)
100 Caps, 24 goals, 14 assists

This was always a bit of a sneaky one for me. Joe-Max Moore was a consistently reliable attacking option for the USMNT during this era, even if he didn’t always get the spotlight. Currently ranked seventh all-time in USMNT goals, Moore contributed across three World Cup cycles and remained a steady presence in the attack.

He’s also one of just five USMNT players to score four goals in a single match, a standout performance that came against El Salvador in 1993. Despite his overall production and longevity, however, Moore was never able to find the back of the net on the World Cup (1994, 1998 and 2002) stage.

Brian McBride (1993 – 2006)
95 Caps, 30 goals, 11 assists

A traditional No. 9, Brian McBride was physical, relentless, and dependable, with a dominant aerial presence in the biggest moments. He put everything on the line for the USMNT, scoring in multiple World Cups (1998 and 2002) and cementing himself as a fixture at the striker position.

One of his most iconic moments came at the 2006 World Cup, when he was elbowed in the face by Italy’s Daniele De Rossi, leaving him bloodied and in need of stitches, yet he still played the full 90 minutes.

Clint Mathis (1998 – 2005)
46 Caps, 12 goals, 9 assists

While Clint Mathis had a relatively brief run with the USMNT, his impact on the attacking position was undeniable. Often deployed as a second striker behind Brian McBride, Mathis was anything but traditional—he thrived as a free-roaming attacker capable of changing a match in an instant, highlighted by his ability to score spectacular long-range goals.

He played a key role for the U.S. at the 2002 FIFA World Cup, scoring a memorable goal against South Korea in the group stage and adding an assist, helping power the team’s historic run.

The Evolving Striker Pool (2009 – 2018)

The striker pool from this generation is an interesting mix, some players were only involved with the USMNT for brief stretches, while others carried over from the previous era and overlapped with this group.

Strikers like Edson Buddle and Hercules Gomez, both part of the 2010 World Cup roster, had limited opportunities and production at the international level. Their inclusion was shaped in part by circumstance, as Charlie Davies’ recovery from his car accident less than a year before the tournament ultimately ruled him out of contention.

Looking ahead to 2014, Aron Jóhannsson and Chris Wondolowski earned World Cup roster spots but struggled to make a lasting impact in the biggest matches against top-tier opponents, which limited their long-term roles with the national team.

Players like Jordan Morris, Jesús Ferreira, and Gyasi Zardes emerged and saw increased opportunities following the failure to qualify for the 2018 World Cup. It’s easy to imagine that at least some of that younger group could have factored into the roster had the U.S. made it to Russia.

Clint Dempsey (2004 – 2017)
141 Caps, 57 goals, 19 assists

Clint Dempsey delivered some of the most iconic striker moments in USMNT history, big goals, clutch performances, and a relentless ability to show up when it mattered most. While he wasn’t a traditional target striker, his movement, instincts, and technical ability made him one of the most dangerous attacking players the U.S. has ever had.

He scored against top-tier opponents like Spain and Brazil at the 2009 Confederations Cup, found the net against England at the 2010 World Cup to help secure a crucial draw, and famously opened the scoring just seconds into the 2014 World Cup. He also delivered in the 2016 Copa América, with key goals against Ecuador in the quarterfinal and Paraguay in the group stage.

Dempsey wasn’t just a scorer, he was a moment-maker. Whether it was a scrappy finish, a composed strike, or stepping up in the biggest matches, he consistently delivered when the U.S. needed him most.

Jozy Altidore (2007 – 2019)
115 Caps, 42 goals, 14 assists

Jozy Altidore had a unique USMNT career, less about highlight-reel volume and more about physical presence, hold-up play, and stepping up in key moments. At his best, he was the focal point of the attack and a difference-maker. Jozy’s work ethic seemed to impact later stages of his club and USMNT career and impacted him becoming the all-time leading scorer in USMNT history.

Bobby Wood (2013 – 2018)
43 Caps, 13 goals, 3 assists

If it weren’t for Jürgen Klinsmann’s support after Bobby Wood secured a new club in Germany, it’s unclear whether his international career would have continued. While his peak was relatively brief at both club and national level, Wood made his mark with clutch moments, most memorably scoring game-winning goals in back-to-back 2015 friendlies: a 4–3 comeback victory over the Netherlands and a 2–1 win against Germany.

The Next Generation: Assessing the Future of USMNT Strikers

The current USMNT striker pool remains very unsettled. At the moment, Ricardo Pepi is the only regular forward to reach double-digit goals, with 13. He’s followed by Folarin Balogun with eight and Haji Wright with seven. Other notable names in the mix include Josh Sargent and Patrick Agyemang, each of whom has contributed five goals at the international level. However, Agyemang suffered an Achilles injury and has been ruled out of the World Cup, a significant setback given his recent form. For the USMNT to be successful at the 2026 FIFA World Cup their strikers will be a key role and contributing to the teams’ goals scored.

From a club perspective at the time of the article, Balogun is in excellent form, and the hope is that continues through the 2026 FIFA World Cup. At this point, it feels clear that Balogun and Pepi have established themselves as the top two striker options. The bigger question, though, is who else will step up to provide the depth and quality needed to sustain the position in this cycle and beyond.

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Entry into US Men’s National Fandom

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Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)

Every soccer fan has a player or a moment or signature win that pulls them into the game and binds them to a team, no matter how high or low the journey becomes.

For me, that moment was tied to the U.S. Men’s National Team hosting the 1994 World Cup, along with my own recent introduction to the sport as the starting goalkeeper for my school team. Tony Meola, in particular, stood out as one of many important icons and trailblazers for the USMNT during that era.

I imagine there are countless young fans around the world who have already had, or will soon have, that defining moment over the last few years: discovering their first international team and the players they’ll root for and follow for years to come.

Before the 1990 World Cup cycle, those moments were rare for the USMNT. The United States hadn’t even reached the final round of CONCACAF World Cup Qualifying. Their closest opportunity came during the 1986 cycle, when all the U.S. needed was a draw at home against Costa Rica, a result they had achieved just five days earlier on the road in Costa Rica.

In the 1980s, the USMNT qualified for the Olympics three times, once automatically as the host nation in 1984 and twice through the qualifying tournament. It’s also worth noting that Mexico was disqualified during both the 1980 and 1988 qualifying cycles.

Despite qualifying, the U.S. withdrew from the 1980 Olympics in protest of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the tournaments they did play (1984 and 1988), the USMNT struggled to make an impact, failing to advance out of the group stage and managing just one combined win across both competitions.

USMNT on the Rise (1988-1998)

This generation of trailblazers put the U.S. Men’s National Team back on the map—ending a 40-year World Cup drought, hosting the 1994 World Cup, and advancing further than the world expected.

1989 WCQ neutral side in Honduras vs El Salvador

A rare win away from home soil keeps US in hunt to qualify for 1990 World Cup. 

1989 – Qualification at Trinidad & Tobago

The win in Port of Spain sends the US to its first World Cup since 1950.

1990 – Return to the World Cup (Italy)

Results were tough, but simply qualifying restarted the program on the world stage.

1991 – USA 2–0 Mexico (Gold Cup)

The USMNT’s first “Dos a Cero” win against Mexico to advance to the first Gold Cup Final.

1993 – USA 2-0 England (U.S. Cup)

The USMNT first win against England since the 1950 World Cup.

1994 – USA 2–1 Colombia (World Cup)

One of the biggest upsets in World Cup history; launched U.S. soccer into the mainstream.

1995 – USA 3-0 Argentina (Copa America)

The apex win for this generation of USMNT trailblazers.

1998 – USA 1-0 Brazil (Gold Cup)

The USMNT only win over Brazil to date.

Earning Respect from the World (1999-2010)

After a disappointing performance at the 1998 World Cup, the USMNT reset by hiring American coach Bruce Arena. That decision, combined with the emergence of impactful young players, helped restore credibility and earn growing respect on the global stage—culminating in a deep and memorable run at the 2002 World Cup.

1999 – 2-0 Win over Germany (Confederations Cup)

USMNT second win over Germany in 1999.

2001 – First “Dos a Cero” vs Mexico in Columbus (World Cup Qualifier)

A rivalry-defining moment and a psychological turning point.

2002 – USA 3–2 Portugal (World Cup)

The world took notice. One of the greatest performances in USMNT history.

2002 – USA 2–0 Mexico (World Cup Round of 16)

Dominance over rival Mexico on the biggest stage.

2002 – World Cup Quarterfinal run (loss 1–0 to Germany)

Even in a loss the USMNT deepest World Cup run got attention from most.

2005 – USA 2-0 Mexico in Columbus (World Cup Qualifier)

USMNT WCQ win over Mexico qualified them for the World Cup.

2007 – Gold Cup Final: USA 2–1 Mexico (Gold Cup)

A signature win in Chicago with a classic Donovan goal.

2009 – USA 2–0 Spain (Confederations Cup)

Ends Spain’s 35-match unbeaten streak in a historic semifinal upset.

2010 – Donovan vs Algeria (90+1’)

The most iconic goal in USMNT history; dramatic group-stage escape.

The Klinsmann Era (2011-2017)

When Jürgen Klinsmann was hired to replace Bob Bradley, he introduced a new mindset for the USMNT, challenging players to compete at higher levels with their clubs. The opponents he scheduled during his tenure reflected that philosophy, consistently pushing the team against stronger international competition.

2012 – USA 1-0 Italy (Friendly)

A key road win for the USMNT under Klinsmann.

2012 – USA 1-0 Mexico (Friendly)

The Americans first ever win at Azteca in Mexico.

2013 – USA 4-3 Germany (Centennial Match)

Celebrating their centennial match in style with a win.

2013 – USA 4-3 Bosnia-Herzegovina (Friendly)

A comeback road win against the 13th ranked Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2013 – USA 2-0 Mexico (World Cup Qualifier)

Nothing better than Dos a Cero that qualifies you for the World Cup.

2014 – USA 2–1 Ghana (World Cup)

Revenge at last, with a clutch John Brooks header helping to advance from Group of Death.

2015 – USA 4-3 Netherlands (Friendly)

A thrilling comeback victory on the road against the Netherlands.

2015 – USA 2-1 Germany (Friendly)

Days after beating the Netherlands, the USMNT topped Germany in a hard-fought match.

2016 – USA 2-1 Ecuador (Copa America)

A quarter-final win for the Americans who advance to the semi-finals of Copa America.

The Rise of a New Generation (2018-Current)

After the failure to qualify for the 2018 World Cup, the USMNT landscape began to shift. A greater emphasis was placed on integrating younger players into the national team, even as it became increasingly difficult for the U.S. to schedule friendlies against top-level opponents from Europe and South America.

2021 – USA 3-2 Mexico (Nations League)

This extra-time win sparked a period of dominance over Mexico.

2022 – USA 3-0 Morocco (Friendly)

A victory over the eventual fourth-place finisher at the 2022 World Cup.

2022 – USA 1-0 Iran (World Cup)

A first-half strike from Christian Pulisic propels the U.S. into the knockout stage.

2023 – USA 3-0 Mexico (Nations League)

A dominant semifinal win preceded Gregg Berhalter’s rehiring.

2024 -USA 2-0 Mexico (Nations League)

Another victory over El Tri, extending the unbeaten run to seven matches.

A Chance to Win will bring in New Believers Ahead of 2026

The USMNT has a prime opportunity to build momentum and attract new supporters ahead of the 2026 World Cup, with upcoming friendlies against European powers Belgium, Portugal, and Germany, along with AFCON champions Senegal. These high-profile matchups offer a rare spotlight and a chance to measure themselves against the world’s best.

A deep World Cup run, reaching the quarterfinals or beyond, would go a long way toward winning and retaining new fans. But to truly grow the fanbase, success must be consistent, with fewer lapses and a standard of performance that reinforces belief long after the tournament ends.

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