USMNT
The 433 and why the USMNT is “forcing” a playmaking 6
Published
5 years agoon
By
Shawn BrooksThe base formation for the USMNT under Berhalter has been the 433. That’s been unchanged. If you look around the world at some of the best teams, many seem to have the base of a 433. Man City, Liverpool, Real Madrid, Bayern, Barcelona, Ajax. Why is this structure or formation so popular?
I have a theory.
Formations and systems are trendy. It wasn’t that long ago that the 4231 was all anyone had been playing. In the last year, we saw a heavy use of 3 in the back systems across the major teams. Tuchel went from heavily using the 433 at PSG to using a 343 variant at Chelsea to great effect. Man City and Barcelona were seen using the 343 a lot this year too. The base still seems to be the 433.
Strengths and weaknesses
One thing most anyone who has coached soccer or studied soccer for any amount of time will agree on, is that there is no magical formation. Every system has weaknesses and most players and coaches learn those early on.
A few examples:



The advantages and disadvantages of a particular system can fill whole books and videos. There are lots of nuances, variations and adaptations as well. The point is- every system or formation has weaknesses and strengths.
If a team has one way of playing and one set of starting 11, then they become very easy to scheme against. A better talented team may still win. A team can even “punch up” if their particular personnel strengths play to another team’s particular weaknesses and that coach is poor at tactical schemes. But a team playing one starting 11 with the same starting 11, will always be at a disadvantage against a team that has multiple tools in the tool box and an understanding on how to attack your weaknesses.
Tactical Flexibility
Every coach knows the basic answers to a formation’s weaknesses. Therefore the best system is one that is highly adaptable. The 433 is one of the most adaptable systems you can play. With simple role changes, the system can look like a completely different system. (I am purposefully oversimplifying for the examples.)

If your opponent is troubling your 6 or if you’re having trouble with numbers in the midfield you can simply drop an 8 deeper.


The 433 has the most different versions. With one base system, tactically adept managers can get a lot of tactical flexibility. This is how managers like Pep and Tuchel can create so many different problems and solutions out of one team. They try to keep the changes simple and base the same. The run patterns, principles, and solutions to problems can all be the same and the requests of the players can change from game to game.
Fans often can’t see the trees because of the forest. A coach can tweak individual roles and keep the base the same. The forest shape looks different but it was changed with one tree.
Tactical variability
This tactical flexibility has led to a new form of Total Football. Total Football originally was all about interchanging players to different roles on the field. It requires players with the ability to play different positions in game. With the tools of diverse players and a system with flexible tactics, tactically adept managers can create new dimensions of problems to solve and solutions.
Modern soccer tactics have evolved beyond a single structure or formation. A team will use often use at least 4 structures these days. First, is their base. For the US this is the 433.

The second is one in possession that they want to use to break teams down. For the US this is most often the 2323.

The third is what they want to use in a transition and against a mid block.

The last is what they want to use in a low block. This seems to be a 4231 or 4141.

Out of one “formation,” common patterns of play, set solutions to teams attack/ defense patterns, a team can get an incredible amount of tactical variability. It’s why many managers struggle or scoff at the idea of what “formation” they play. They play many in different situations and different match ups. A key to winning close games in modern US soccer tactics is tactical flexibility.
Roles and Role Profiles
The next logical question is- if the US want to be that tactically flexible then why focus on player profiles at all? Why not just put the best 11 out there in the best system you can and play?
My theory is that the 433 creates the most diverse player profiles. If the goal of a system is to be tactically flexible then you need players that can cover a large range for roles. A tactical minded coach would want every possible tool in the tool bag.
This can be true for multiple roles from the 9 to even the GK. The most talked about recently for the US has been the 6. If I was writing a player profile and rating players on their ability to play the 6, it would look something like this:

From a recruitment and development standpoint, you want players that are 5 stars in every category. In the ideal world, you would then have at least 3 players deep at that role. One man is down, then another is up.
No team has that in reality- not even the best teams. The question I get the most about the 6, is why are they forcing a playmaking 6? If they don’t have one, simply don’t play one. I truly think this is a simple misunderstanding of the 6 and how modern teams are constructed. The overall system of play is built with predefine answers to problems created by the opposition. Good teams want all of those tools in the tool bag to win any particular match up.
If you’re in the structure below the most, then playmaking ability becomes very important all over the field to break down a pack defense. Against Honduras late, they had them backed into a low block and needed Brooks to play extremely high up to make a play over the top to McKennie that leads to the winning goal.

Even earlier in the game, the US seemed to work to keep Honduras out of the low block by making plays deeper with their CB’s. Without Brooks playing fantastically and without Honduras failing to man mark him- the US may not win that game. Wanting a playmaking 6 in that scenario made a lot of sense. If you go back and watch how badly he missed lots of opportunities, it highlights the need for that attribute on the team rather than the reverse.


Even in a low block set up, transition play often starts with the 6 from deep. They either provide an outlet to start the attack or a quick counter pass to start the attack. Adams, who is somewhat of a specialist for RB Leipzig in this, is probably at his best in starting the counter- as a playmaking 6. That is a key attribute of the role. One reason the US struggled to counter, build or do much offensively against Mexico is Acosta is a better disruptor and wasn’t much of an asset in the attack. It’s a key part of the role profile and having that player profile adds tactical flexibility.
Let’s look at Nashville SC as a counter example. Their base formation has been a 4231. Dax is something of a modern 6 but Godoy is more of a 6/8 hybrid. He’s more comfortable tackling than driving forward with the ball, making line breaking passes, or linking play. He often plays as a 6/8 in front of Dax, but because their base formation is 4231, their player profiles hedged defensively. One could say its’ worked with the level of success they’ve had for an expansion side but that base has limited their tactical flexibility.
You can move Godoy to an 8 and play more of a 433, but the team will still be a more defensive team than offensive. It’s how they were constructed. The player profiles provide the template for the tools the team wants in the tool bag. Those tools can determine how a team plays as much or more than formation.
The #9 as a comparison
Would you say the same thing of the 9? If we don’t have a striker, just don’t play one? No- you specialize per match up.
We saw this a great deal with Chelsea (and Man City) and the #9 last year. What any team would want in a #9 player profile would be things like hold up ability, intelligent runs, poaching/finishing ability, aerial ability, speed to get in behind and playmaking ability to drop into the midfield to move the CB’s and create opportunities for others. Neither Chelsea nor Man City had a #9 who fit all of those attributes this year. So they used the players they had as specialist for particular match ups.
This is simply what good teams do. Giroud, Havertz, and Werner give you different attributes all by playing the same role, the same way but with different strengths. Havertz will do better coming back and creating. He’ll pull Cbs up and out more. Giroud will win headers, provide a target to combine with and Werner will stretch them vertically. They will do this though all playing the same patterns. The system needs to run the same so that the players quickly use the right solution to the right problem provided by the opposition.
You don’t tell Werner to stop trying to win aerial balls. You don’t tell Giroud to never drop into the midfield. You don’t change the team’s patterns of play based on who is available or preferred that game. You just pick the right players with correct attributes for a particular match up. When coaches get this right it makes these specialists look world class. When they get it wrong, you get fans thinking the players and coach are trash. This was seen a lot with Giroud last year and Jorginho and Kante through the years. Ask Kante to be the deeper playmaker and he seems a flawed player. Let him be a disrupter (either as a 6 or 8) and he looks world class. Same for Jorginho. Set him up to be a deeper play maker and positional defense expert, and he looks world class. Ask him to be a disrupter or destroyer and he looks horrible.
What managers who compete with the best teams and best managers in the world want, is that tactical diversity at the highest level. They then need to define what those attributes are so teams can recruit and acquire them.
Poorer teams or national teams with less options to buy talent do a similar process but have to rely even more on specialists to fill roles. They are even less likely to get players who are the best at every attribute of a role. They rely more on specialists. Some teams are graced with Rodri who can do everything a role demands. Or teams like France who are simply more talented than everyone else. Many teams are not and what they do is select the right specialist for the particular match up.
The structure (formation) of a team can change from game to game and even within a game. The player profiles are the base players that a coach/manager wants to build around. With club teams, it’s who they recruit, transfer for, and develop. For national teams it’s really the same except transfer. It’s the base roles that they want to recruit (dual nationals), discover through scouting their profile, and develop by getting them recognized for bigger teams.
By having player profiles, a club can build a squad with the most tactical options. The weaker the team’s talent pool, the more reliant a team will be on specialists. The deeper the talent pool, the more tools a manager has in his tool bag to create problems for the opposition.
The US have unique problems as they have a huge drop off from most of their starting players to their depth. It creates more emphasis on getting those specialist right and much greater criticism when those specialist fail at their role.
The US are not forcing anything
The trick in the modern game is not having one tactical setup that you roll out every match. It’s how tactically diverse can your team be? They have to predict which structures will be used the most in a given game. Will we be in the low block the most? Will we be in the high press the most? Will we be breaking down the low block the most? How can we force the other team to be in the set up that we most want? Then- what player attributes do I have in my tool box to keep us in that formation and win the game? How do I ensure that I have the right variety of tools to match 90% of the problems we’ll see?
The US is not forcing a playmaking 6. They have a player profile for every position and then are attempting to choose the right tool for the right matchup. Yueill over Acosta to break down Honduras and make plays from deep (which he did poorly). Siebatcheu for Sargent to win balls in the air. Acosta for Yueill to add disruption and rangy press.
I think we can all expect this to continue and not stop as the player pool increases in talent. Right now Adams is levels better at most every attribute of the player profile at the 6, but even if we can get 23 players who are all world class- current modern tactics likely dictate a player will be chosen per match up rather than a simple depth chart. While fans love to create depth charts at every position, the reality of those depth charts are likely a lot more complicated.
Why the 433 and 433 profiles?
The 433 and its profiles fill out the tool bag and sets up a diverse operating template for the modern soccer chess match.
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USMNT
Side by Side: The Looking at USMNT Center Back Pairings – Past & Present
Published
23 hours agoon
May 17, 2026
If the March 2026 window revealed anything about the United States men’s national soccer team, it’s that their center-back group, whether in a two- or three-man setup, lacks cohesion heading into the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The partnership, continuity, and communication between center backs are critical to organizing the entire defense, and right now, that foundation doesn’t look fully settled.
That realization prompted a look back over the past 40 years, examining the different center-back pairings, how they developed chemistry, and the impact those partnerships had on the USMNT at the highest level.
The Steadfast Anchor of the 1990 USMNT Defense

Mike Windischmann, captain of the 1990 USMNT World Cup team, was a cornerstone of the squad throughout the 1990 cycle. For much of that period, he was paired at center-back with Steve Trittschuh, though the two didn’t start together at the World Cup itself. Windischmann also formed defensive partnerships with John Doyle, Marcelo Balboa, and Paul Caligiuri at various points. At the World Cup, he teamed up with Jimmy Banks in two of the three matches, providing leadership and stability at the heart of the U.S. backline.
Trailblazers Building a Solid Back Line for the Future

Much like the 1990 cycle, Marcelo Balboa was a constant presence on the USMNT back line, whether playing as a sweeper under Bora Milutinović or in a back three with six midfielders in front of him under Steve Sampson. He formed key partnerships with emerging talents like Alexi Lalas, who joined the team in 1992, and dual-national Thomas Dooley. This defensive core enjoyed significant successes throughout the 1994 and 1998 cycles, including advancing out of the group stage at the 1994 World Cup, defeating Argentina at the 1995 Copa América, and taking Brazil to the brink in a hard-fought semifinal.
A Defensive Anchor in U.S. Soccer History

Widely regarded as one of the top center-backs in U.S. men’s national team history, Eddie Pope featured in three consecutive FIFA World Cups (1998, 2002, and 2006), starting in all three for the USMNT. At the 2002 tournament, he anchored a formidable back line alongside Tony Sanneh and Jeff Agoos, forming a disciplined and resilient defensive unit for the United States men’s national soccer team. That group played a key role in one of the program’s deepest modern World Cup runs, but does it stand as the best defensive unit the USMNT has ever produced?
A Peak Partnership Interrupted

For me, one of the strongest center-back pairings in United States men’s national soccer team history emerged during the 2010 cycle, anchored by Carlos Bocanegra and Oguchi Onyewu. The duo arguably reached their peak at the 2009 Confederations Cup, forming a physically dominant and well-organized backbone.
Unfortunately, Onyewu’s injury leading into the 2010 World Cup limited his effectiveness, preventing the partnership from carrying that same level into the tournament. In his absence, Jay DeMerit stepped in seamlessly, providing valuable depth and steady performances, highlighting the overall strength of the USMNT’s center-back pool during that period.
From Breakthrough to Breakdown

The center-back pairing of Omar Gonzalez and Matt Besler came together late in the 2014 cycle but quickly developed into a reliable and cohesive duo at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Their understanding and physical presence helped stabilize the back line on the world stage.
That tournament also introduced a rising presence in John Brooks, who memorably scored the game-winning goal against Ghana after Besler picked up a knock, announcing himself in a major moment.
As the cycle turned toward 2018, Brooks continued to establish himself, often partnering with Geoff Cameron, while Gonzalez and Besler remained in the mix depending on form and fitness. However, as the 2018 cycle progressed, inconsistency and a lack of cohesion among the center-backs became an issue, one of several factors that ultimately contributed to the United States men’s national soccer team failing to qualify for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
Emerging Stability Ahead of the 2022 World Cup

Heading into the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the United States men’s national soccer team faced real uncertainty at center back, with no clear anchor or leader emerging. That quickly changed, as Tim Ream stepped in and solidified himself as the steadying presence of the back line.
A major turning point came when Miles Robinson suffered a ruptured Achilles tendon in the summer leading up to the tournament—a significant blow given his form and importance to the group. His absence opened the door for Walker Zimmerman, who had already been in contention, to establish a strong partnership alongside Ream.
Meanwhile, Aaron Long, returning from his own Achilles injury in 2021, earned a place on the roster, and Cameron Carter-Vickers also featured, with both players contributing minutes during the tournament. Together, this group brought stability to a position that had looked unsettled just months earlier.
2026 at Center Back Uncertainty and Opportunity

There are more questions than answers surrounding the United States men’s national soccer team center-back picture heading into the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Chris Richards appears to be a near lock, while Tim Ream, though still a trusted presence, has shown signs of decline compared to four years ago, yet could still find his way onto the roster based on experience and leadership.
A key variable will be how Mauricio Pochettino sets up tactically, particularly whether he opts for a two or three center-back system. In a back three, players like Joe Scally and Alex Freeman could slide into right center-back roles given their versatility, while Mark McKenzie and Auston Trusty provide options on the left. Miles Robinson also remains firmly in the mix as competition for a roster spot.
Perhaps the biggest unknown is Noahkai Banks. The 19-year-old dual national, currently playing in the Bundesliga, opted out of a recent USMNT camp while weighing his international future between the United States and Germany. If he ultimately commits, his emergence could significantly impact the depth and ceiling of the USMNT’s center-back pool heading into 2026.
Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)
Over the decades, the United States Men’s National Soccer Team has been accompanied by a wide range of voices behind the microphone, delivering some of the most memorable calls in World Cup history.
Along the way, several standout broadcast duos have helped shape the viewing experience and left a lasting mark on the USMNT landscape.
Here’s a look back at the voices that have defined US World Cup broadcasts since 1990.
1990 FIFA World Cup – Italy
Network: ESPN
Play-by-play: Bob Ley
Color: Paul Gardner

Coverage of the USMNT at the 1990 World Cup was limited, particularly in the early rounds, but Bob Ley emerged as one of the defining voices of soccer on U.S. television during that era. His presence helped introduce a new generation of American fans to the international game, providing context and credibility at a time when the global stage still felt unfamiliar to much of the US audience.
1994 FIFA World Cup – United States of America
1998 FIFA World Cup – France
2002 FIFA World Cup – Japan / South Korea
Networks: ABC / ESPN
Play-by-play: JP Dellacamera
Color: Ty Keough

This play-by-play and color commentary duo called three World Cups for the USMNT, becoming the defining voice of the team during my peak viewing years. Ty Keough the former USMNT midfielder from the late 1970s and early 1980s.
JP Dellacamera stands out as one of, if not the, best play-by-play announcers and remains one of my favorites. While others on this list delivered memorable moments, they didn’t quite match that same level of longevity.
2006 FIFA World Cup – Germany
Networks: ABC / ESPN
Play-by-play: Dave O’Brien
Color: Marcelo Balboa

New England native Dave O’Brien, widely known today for calling major sports across his career, had just one World Cup as the primary play-by-play voice for the USMNT. His run calling USMNT matches, primarily in the mid-2000s on ESPN, was relatively brief but still memorable. While he isn’t as closely associated with the USMNT as some other broadcasters, he was behind the mic for several standout moments during that era.
2010 FIFA World Cup – South Korea
Network: ESPN
Play-by-play: Ian Darke
Color: John Harkes

Ian Darke brought a global voice to American audiences as the lead play-by-play announcer for the USMNT during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Already well known around the world, he made the tournament easy to connect with for U.S. fans and delivered one of the most iconic calls in American soccer history.
Darke’s iconic call of the USMNT game winning goal by Landon Donovan in must win final group stage match against Algeria to advance to the knockout stage of the 2010 World Cup gives me chills every time I see it.
2014 FIFA World Cup – Brazil
Networks: ESPN / ABC
Play-by-play: Ian Darke
Color: Taylor Twellman

This duo might be my favorite to date. Ian Darke brought a clear, global voice to USMNT viewers during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, making the tournament easy to follow for US fans while elevating the biggest moments with calm, sharp, and memorable calls.
Alongside him, Taylor Twellman emerged as one of the most recognizable and influential voices of the modern era, primarily as a lead analyst on ESPN. His passionate, unfiltered style stood out, most notably with his unforgettable “What are we doing?!” reaction following the USMNT’s failure to qualify for the 2018 World Cup, a moment that’s still talked about today.
2022 FIFA World Cup – Qatar
Network: FOX Sports
Play-by-play: John Strong
Color: Stu Holden

If the USMNT had qualified for the 2018 World Cup, this broadcast team would have called their matches, marking what would have been a third straight World Cup cycle with the same primary commentary crew. It’s also likely he’ll be paired again with Stu Holden for USMNT matches at the 2026 World Cup.
John Strong has served as a lead play-by-play voice for U.S. soccer on FOX Sports since 2018, bringing a modern, high-energy style to the booth. Since taking on major international assignments, he’s become one of the defining voices for USMNT audiences in top competitions, known for his clear, sharp calls and a big-game tone that fits the moment.
The growth and success of Major League Soccer has led to more players from around the world representing MLS at the World Cup, with this summer’s tournament expected to feature the highest total yet.
1998 was the first World Cup played after the launch of Major League Soccer. Here’s a breakdown of MLS-based players on World Cup rosters by year:
1998 – 18 (T-8th)
Tied with Liga MX for 8th most. This would the first and only time the USMNT World Cup roster
2002 – 11 (18th)
All 11 were from the USMNT
2006 – 15 (14th)
11 of the 15 were #USMNT players.
2010 – 6 (25th)
The lowest total to date. Only 6 MLS players, with 4 on the USMNT. This coincided with the peak of US players based in Europe.
2014 – 21 (10th)
Less than half were USMNT players, though the US still led the way the 10 most notably DeAndre Yedlin (20) getting the call.
2018 – 18 (11th)
This number likely would’ve been significantly higher had the USMNT qualified, potentially pushing MLS into the top 7–8 leagues.
2022 – 36 (6th)
The highest total yet, just behind Ligue 1 for 5th. Also worth noting, rosters expanded from 23 to 26 players for this tournament and the first time that the USA didn’t have the most players
Overall, the trend shows steady growth in MLS representation, both domestically and internationally.
MLS Pipeline Continues for the USMNT
It’s rare for a World Cup–qualified nation not to have a strong share of its players featured across tournament rosters. Canada was a recent exception in 2022, though their ties to MLS remain significant with multiple clubs in the league.
With roster selection less than a month away, it’s reasonable to expect that roughly a third of the #USMNT squad will come from MLS. Below is a positional breakdown of the MLS players Mauricio Pochettino has called in during his tenure as USMNT manager.
Goalkeepers
The USMNT is set to start an MLS-based goalkeeper at a World Cup for the first time, with all of the top options currently playing in MLS.
Chris Brady is one of the goalkeepers I’m most excited to watch in the coming cycles. He’s been performing at a high level in Major League Soccer and looks like a strong candidate to fill the long-term role as the USMNT’s primary starter over the next few cycles.

Chris Brady
Roman Celentano
Matt Freese
Patrick Schulte
Matt Turner
Defenders
Veteran center-backs Tim Ream and Miles Robinson seem likely to be selected with Blackmon a possibility depending on the health of the remaining pool. Arfsten seems to be almost a lock due to his ability to attack and create scoring chances with his crosses from the wing.

Max Arfsten
Tristan Blackmon
Tim Ream
Miles Robinson
Midfielders
The USMNT has strong depth in midfield, and Mauricio Pochettino’s recent roster selections suggest he’ll likely round out the squad with some of the players listed below.
One of the biggest gaps in this USMNT roster is the true dynamic, creative spark in the attacking third. Diego Luna stands out in that role, capable of unsettling defenses, breaking lines, and changing the rhythm of a match. He’s exactly the type of player who could thrive in a super-sub role, coming on against tired legs and making an impact at this summer’s World Cup.

Sebastian Berhalter
Diego Luna
Jack McGlynn
Cristian Roldan
Timothy Tillman
Forwards
Striker may be the toughest position for the MLS group to crack the #USMNT World Cup roster, but Brian White is making a strong case, scoring eight goals in his first nine MLS matches at the time of writing.
Brian White is a highly productive, “old-school” style striker for the USMNT, known for his elite positioning, relentless work rate, and ability to finish in a variety of ways. That combination makes him a strong option as a striker off the bench, where he could be especially dangerous against tired defenses at this summer’s World Cup.

Paxten Aaronson
Josh Sargent
Brian White
MLS Representation in the USMNT Player Pool
Since 1998, the last time the majority of a USMNT World Cup roster was composed primarily of MLS-based players, it has become increasingly clear that a meaningful portion of the squad still comes from MLS. Consistently, roughly 30–40% of the roster has been drawn from the domestic league, reflecting a long-standing and relatively stable trend in player selection over time which I don’t seen changing anytime soon.
Side by Side: The Looking at USMNT Center Back Pairings – Past & Present
Voices of USMNT on the World Stage
The Expanding Impact of MLS on the World Cup
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