USMNT

Moneyball: An Explanation for 2019

Published

6 years ago

January 31, 2020

Patrick Keeler

There were several persistent issues fans and pundits had with Gregg Berhalter and the USMNT in 2019, beyond results.

Four of the biggest were:

The continued presence on rosters of mid-20s players, from MLS, that were given minutes no matter how they performed for the USMNT or in MLS.
The almost Puritanical need to “Play Out of the Back”, no matter the game state or opposition defense.
A passive mid-block defense that allowed opponents easy entry into our third of the field.
Substitutions that made no sense in competitive games.

There are two theories among fans and analysts who try and analyze the situation, beyond, “Gregg is an idiot who was only hired because he is brothers with the CEO to be.” Whether there is any truth to that statement is counteracted by the idea that nobody could be that big an idiot. Some will disagree of course.

Both theories start from the idea that Gregg, from the day he was hired, had a set system that he wanted to play. That he would find players that fit the system, rather than devise a system that fit the players he had.

The first theory is that Gregg wanted to only rely on data and “player profiles” based on data collected by services like Opta. This tries to explain the #1 complaint by pointing out that most of our talent in Europe is very young, few have first team minutes in large quantities, so there is no Opta data. That since Gregg was only selecting players he could get data on, they mostly were mid-twenties players in MLS who had mountains of data available. Players with good amounts of data could be added, like Pulisic, Brooks, Ream. But players like Richie Ledezma could not.

This theory kind of hits the snag at the exclusion of plenty of players with lots of first team minutes like Antonee Robinson, Duane Holmes, Julian Green, Fabian Johnson, etc. It also doesn’t address #2, 3, 4 in any way other than, Gregg is “naïve”.

My theory, based on things discussed by media members with insider access, is that 2019 was an experiment in a “Moneyball” approach. This is a popular sporting concept in the USA and increasingly around the world. It is looking for incremental competitive advantages using statistical analysis to offset competitive disadvantages in talent disparity. The famous example is how the Oakland A’s used the statistical work of Bill James to build a team on par with the Yankees and Red Sox on 1/50^th the budget.

The idea Gregg, and Earnie Stewart, had and possibly still have, is that the MLS season is very different from the European and South American seasons. The long winter break allows for a long national team training camp in January (Camp Cupcake). Brazil, Germany, France, etc. do not have this opportunity for a long, like a club pre-season, camp. That the extra time could be used to teach a complicated, Pep Guardiola-esque, positional offense that would allow the USMNT, with less talent, to compete with the previous mentioned teams; who can’t run sophisticated offenses because the short windows national teams have together.

Data was used to pick the original January pool. They were drilled in the new system. The idea was that these players would then be able to carry that knowledge forward and help train additional players. New players would be brought in a few at a time until they got up to speed then more could be integrated. This is why the rosters throughout the year featured so many players from January camp (Cupcakers). This is why only the top players in Europe were initially brought in in small numbers. In June, longer camps were held and more non-MLS players were brought in. But when the Gold Cup roster was announced, in the end, it contained 14 Cupcakers out of 23 players. This roughly 2/3rds ratio of Cupcakers to non-Cupcakers was very consistent throughout 2019.

There is no way to teach a possession based positional read and react offense (The System) without playing it. This is why all year, until the final Canada game, the USA played out of the back almost exclusively. Even in the Friendly against Mexico, with Mexico probably figuring out this entire plan and that the USA was not going to go over the top, against 7 and 8 men presses, they played in to the pressure.

But how does this explain why the USMNT played a passive mid-block defense that made teams like Curacao and Canada look like Spain? The defense was deployed by Gregg not to win games or even to win the ball. It was designed to create goal kicks for the USA. The more goal kicks, the more opportunities to play out from the back and practice The System. Since the most limited thing a national team has is minutes of game time, every minute was maximized as a training exercise.

Down by a goal in the Gold Cup Final, Gregg substituted on Roldan for Morris, Zardes for Altidore, and Lovitz for Ream. The last one is really perplexing because Lovitz is not only not a goal threat, but is not even good. This one is discussed a lot because it is so questionable. But all three are Cupcakers subbing in for non-Cupcakers. Gregg must have felt a better execution of The System would lead to a goal or viewed the Gold Cup Final as another training exercise like all the previous games.

Following the second Mexico loss and the loss in Canada, pressure mounted. Against Canada in Orlando, some things changed. The roster was still heavily infested with Cupcakers, but only 4 ended up playing. The USMNT played goal kicks short, but never passed back to the goal keeper like previously. If another short pass was not on, the ball was hit long to a forward. Contrast that with the Mexico friendly where passing back was used to keep possession at all costs; frequently ending up at the feet of a center back on the goal line or in Steffan’s 6 yard box. The USMNT did not sit in a passive mid-block, but instead used a form of high press that led to turnovers and transition goals. The subs were mostly defense for offense which made sense with a multi-goal lead.

I believe several flaws in the “moneyball” approach became apparent:

The Cupcakers that were relied upon were simply not good enough
The reliance on a core Group, doesn’t allow for new or in form players to be integrated quickly or at all.
Most of the young talent breaking through last year and in the upcoming years, will be in Europe and will not be able to attend Camp Cupcake.
The team did not look comfortable executing The System at any point and that is either because Gregg could not teach it, the players could not execute it, or even with the large amount of Cupcakers the European players couldn’t learn it, or the European players could execute it but the MLS players couldn’t keep up.

We don’t know if it has been abandoned and we don’t know if Gregg thinks it was a failure at all. We probably will not know until March at the earliest, maybe not until the CONCACAF National League Final or even World Cup Qualifying in August.

USMNT

Voices of USMNT on the World Stage

Published

2 days ago

May 11, 2026

Thomas Deschaine

Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)

Over the decades, the United States Men’s National Soccer Team has been accompanied by a wide range of voices behind the microphone, delivering some of the most memorable calls in World Cup history.

Along the way, several standout broadcast duos have helped shape the viewing experience and left a lasting mark on the USMNT landscape.

Here’s a look back at the voices that have defined US World Cup broadcasts since 1990.

1990 FIFA World Cup – Italy

Network: ESPN

Play-by-play: Bob Ley

Color: Paul Gardner

Coverage of the USMNT at the 1990 World Cup was limited, particularly in the early rounds, but Bob Ley emerged as one of the defining voices of soccer on U.S. television during that era. His presence helped introduce a new generation of American fans to the international game, providing context and credibility at a time when the global stage still felt unfamiliar to much of the US audience.

1994 FIFA World Cup – United States of America

1998 FIFA World Cup – France

2002 FIFA World Cup – Japan / South Korea

Networks: ABC / ESPN

Play-by-play: JP Dellacamera

Color: Ty Keough

This play-by-play and color commentary duo called three World Cups for the USMNT, becoming the defining voice of the team during my peak viewing years. Ty Keough the former USMNT midfielder from the late 1970s and early 1980s.

JP Dellacamera stands out as one of, if not the, best play-by-play announcers and remains one of my favorites. While others on this list delivered memorable moments, they didn’t quite match that same level of longevity.

2006 FIFA World Cup – Germany

Networks: ABC / ESPN

Play-by-play: Dave O’Brien

Color: Marcelo Balboa

New England native Dave O’Brien, widely known today for calling major sports across his career, had just one World Cup as the primary play-by-play voice for the USMNT. His run calling USMNT matches, primarily in the mid-2000s on ESPN, was relatively brief but still memorable. While he isn’t as closely associated with the USMNT as some other broadcasters, he was behind the mic for several standout moments during that era.

2010 FIFA World Cup – South Korea

Network: ESPN

Play-by-play: Ian Darke

Color: John Harkes

Ian Darke brought a global voice to American audiences as the lead play-by-play announcer for the USMNT during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Already well known around the world, he made the tournament easy to connect with for U.S. fans and delivered one of the most iconic calls in American soccer history.

Darke’s iconic call of the USMNT game winning goal by Landon Donovan in must win final group stage match against Algeria to advance to the knockout stage of the 2010 World Cup gives me chills every time I see it.

2014 FIFA World Cup – Brazil

Networks: ESPN / ABC

Play-by-play: Ian Darke

Color: Taylor Twellman

This duo might be my favorite to date. Ian Darke brought a clear, global voice to USMNT viewers during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, making the tournament easy to follow for US fans while elevating the biggest moments with calm, sharp, and memorable calls.

Alongside him, Taylor Twellman emerged as one of the most recognizable and influential voices of the modern era, primarily as a lead analyst on ESPN. His passionate, unfiltered style stood out, most notably with his unforgettable “What are we doing?!” reaction following the USMNT’s failure to qualify for the 2018 World Cup, a moment that’s still talked about today.

2022 FIFA World Cup – Qatar

Network: FOX Sports

Play-by-play: John Strong

Color: Stu Holden

If the USMNT had qualified for the 2018 World Cup, this broadcast team would have called their matches, marking what would have been a third straight World Cup cycle with the same primary commentary crew. It’s also likely he’ll be paired again with Stu Holden for USMNT matches at the 2026 World Cup.

John Strong has served as a lead play-by-play voice for U.S. soccer on FOX Sports since 2018, bringing a modern, high-energy style to the booth. Since taking on major international assignments, he’s become one of the defining voices for USMNT audiences in top competitions, known for his clear, sharp calls and a big-game tone that fits the moment.

Club News

The Expanding Impact of MLS on the World Cup

Published

1 week ago

May 4, 2026

Thomas Deschaine

The growth and success of Major League Soccer has led to more players from around the world representing MLS at the World Cup, with this summer’s tournament expected to feature the highest total yet.

1998 was the first World Cup played after the launch of Major League Soccer. Here’s a breakdown of MLS-based players on World Cup rosters by year:

1998 – 18 (T-8th)
Tied with Liga MX for 8th most. This would the first and only time the USMNT World Cup roster

2002 – 11 (18th)
All 11 were from the USMNT

2006 – 15 (14th)
11 of the 15 were #USMNT players.

2010 – 6 (25th)
The lowest total to date. Only 6 MLS players, with 4 on the USMNT. This coincided with the peak of US players based in Europe.

2014 – 21 (10th)
Less than half were USMNT players, though the US still led the way the 10 most notably DeAndre Yedlin (20) getting the call.

2018 – 18 (11th)
This number likely would’ve been significantly higher had the USMNT qualified, potentially pushing MLS into the top 7–8 leagues.

2022 – 36 (6th)
The highest total yet, just behind Ligue 1 for 5th. Also worth noting, rosters expanded from 23 to 26 players for this tournament and the first time that the USA didn’t have the most players

Overall, the trend shows steady growth in MLS representation, both domestically and internationally.

MLS Pipeline Continues for the USMNT

It’s rare for a World Cup–qualified nation not to have a strong share of its players featured across tournament rosters. Canada was a recent exception in 2022, though their ties to MLS remain significant with multiple clubs in the league.

With roster selection less than a month away, it’s reasonable to expect that roughly a third of the #USMNT squad will come from MLS. Below is a positional breakdown of the MLS players Mauricio Pochettino has called in during his tenure as USMNT manager.

Goalkeepers

The USMNT is set to start an MLS-based goalkeeper at a World Cup for the first time, with all of the top options currently playing in MLS.

Chris Brady is one of the goalkeepers I’m most excited to watch in the coming cycles. He’s been performing at a high level in Major League Soccer and looks like a strong candidate to fill the long-term role as the USMNT’s primary starter over the next few cycles.

Chris Brady
Roman Celentano
Matt Freese
Patrick Schulte
Matt Turner

Defenders

Veteran center-backs Tim Ream and Miles Robinson seem likely to be selected with Blackmon a possibility depending on the health of the remaining pool. Arfsten seems to be almost a lock due to his ability to attack and create scoring chances with his crosses from the wing.

Max Arfsten
Tristan Blackmon
Tim Ream
Miles Robinson

Midfielders

The USMNT has strong depth in midfield, and Mauricio Pochettino’s recent roster selections suggest he’ll likely round out the squad with some of the players listed below.

One of the biggest gaps in this USMNT roster is the true dynamic, creative spark in the attacking third. Diego Luna stands out in that role, capable of unsettling defenses, breaking lines, and changing the rhythm of a match. He’s exactly the type of player who could thrive in a super-sub role, coming on against tired legs and making an impact at this summer’s World Cup.

Sebastian Berhalter
Diego Luna
Jack McGlynn
Cristian Roldan
Timothy Tillman

Forwards

Striker may be the toughest position for the MLS group to crack the #USMNT World Cup roster, but Brian White is making a strong case, scoring eight goals in his first nine MLS matches at the time of writing.

Brian White is a highly productive, “old-school” style striker for the USMNT, known for his elite positioning, relentless work rate, and ability to finish in a variety of ways. That combination makes him a strong option as a striker off the bench, where he could be especially dangerous against tired defenses at this summer’s World Cup.

Paxten Aaronson
Josh Sargent
Brian White

MLS Representation in the USMNT Player Pool

Since 1998, the last time the majority of a USMNT World Cup roster was composed primarily of MLS-based players, it has become increasingly clear that a meaningful portion of the squad still comes from MLS. Consistently, roughly 30–40% of the roster has been drawn from the domestic league, reflecting a long-standing and relatively stable trend in player selection over time which I don’t seen changing anytime soon.

USMNT

The More Things Change, The More They Remain the Same

Published

3 weeks ago

April 20, 2026

Thomas Deschaine

Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)

In light of the recent resignation of Matt Crocker, I revisited something I wrote nearly a decade ago, an early attempt to capture what I called the “Dark Decades of US Soccer.” At the time, the piece was overly long and packed with detail—probably more than today’s audience would stick with.

But buried in that work were meaningful patterns, clear, recurring behaviors that shaped how the federation operated more than 60 years ago. What stood out most, looking back now, is how familiar some of those patterns still feel today.

So, I went back, stripped the piece down, and pulled out the most relevant sections, those that highlight the parallels between past and present. The goal isn’t to draw conclusions for you, but to put those similarities side by side and let you decide: how much has really changed?

World Cup Momentum to the First American Soccer Boom

Soccer star Pele in action during World Cup competition.

Photo of Pele at the 1966 World Cup
Photograph: AP Photo

After the success and popularity of the 1966 World Cup which saw over one million viewers of the tournament many America investors saw the vision and believed that there was the market for soccer in the United States and Canada.

The investors moved very quickly and in 1967 there were two American professional leagues making their debuts the USSFA-sanctioned United Soccer Association (USA) and the independent National Professional Soccer League (NPSL).

These leagues would only last one year and be merged at the request of FIFA into the North American Soccer League (NASL) kicking off in 1968 and relying on mainly on foreign talent. The American investors believed building the interest in soccer in the US would have a direct impact on the growth and performance of the US Men’s National team which and of course more money for the investors and federation.

First Attempt at Modernizing the USMNT

Phil Woosnam, in 1977 as the commissioner of the NASL.
Photograph: AP Photo

Off the back of the success of the inaugural NASL season, the U.S. Soccer Federation appointed Phil Woosnam, fresh off leading the Atlanta Chiefs to a championship and earning Coach of the Year honors, to take charge of the U.S. Men’s National Team.

Woosnam immediately shifted the structure of the program. Instead of a player pool selected by committee, he pushed decision-making toward the coaching staff, allowing selections to be based on performance and fit rather than geography or internal bias. The move was not universally welcomed, and it reportedly created friction with members of the federation’s leadership.

With professional players now more fully available, Woosnam’s approach helped assemble what was widely considered the strongest possible squad at the time. He also introduced organized training camps ahead of friendlies and World Cup qualifiers, an uncommon practice in that era, but one that clearly improved cohesion and preparation. Those changes contributed to the U.S. advancing further in World Cup qualifying than it had in previous cycles.

By early 1969, the USMNT appeared to be building real momentum toward a potential place in the 1970 World Cup. However, tensions between Woosnam and the federation began to escalate. Frustrated with compensation issues and growing interference from the USSF in team operations, Woosnam stepped away from the national team in the spring of 1969. become commissioner of the NASL.

Following his departure, assistant coach Gordon Jago took over as manager. His tenure began under difficult circumstances, with not being able to set up pre-qualifying friendlies, an important part of the progress made under Woosnam along with interference from USSF board members as it related to roster selection which created instability and morale issues on the field. The USMNT struggled in qualifying and ultimately fell short, losing both matches to Haiti, a team they had previously been competitive with in a series of friendlies in 1968.

The Crocker Era: Coaching Chaos and Course Corrections

Photo of Cindy Parlow Cone, Gregg Berhalter, Matt Crocker and JT Batson
Photograph: AP Photo/Lucas Peliter

It’s been roughly three years since the Matt Crocker era began at U.S. Soccer, when he stepped in as Sporting Director, replacing Earnie Stewart.

One of Crocker’s first major responsibilities was hiring the next U.S. Men’s National Team manager. In the previous cycle, the federation had reportedly operated with a narrow set of internal criteria, preferences widely believed to favor English-speaking and American candidates, which significantly limited the coaching pool and shaped the direction of the search.

Roughly two months later, during the Concacaf Nations League semifinal window, it was announced that Gregg Berhalter would be reappointed as USMNT head coach. The decision caught many around the program and in the media off guard, raising questions about how the process had ultimately unfolded.

More recently, in an interview with GiveMeSport, Jesse Marsch stated he was effectively told he was set to become the next USMNT head coach in the late spring of 2023, only for that opportunity to be withdrawn at the last moment, a shift that reportedly had ripple effects on a potential move to Leicester City that was nearing completion.

The abrupt reversal and eventual rehiring of Berhalter has been widely attributed to a mix of factors, including rumored influence from within the player pool, with U.S. Soccer ultimately reversing course. Roughly a year later, after a disappointing Copa América campaign on home soil, Berhalter was dismissed.

Crocker’s second opportunity to reset the program took a different direction. He first secured the high-profile appointment of Emma Hayes, one of the most accomplished managers in women’s football, to lead the USWNT. That move was followed by the hiring of Mauricio Pochettino for the USMNT, a tenure that has delivered mixed early results and will ultimately be judged through the lens of the 2026 World Cup on home soil but truly disappointed that Crocker wouldn’t see through what he helped build, and you have to ask yourself why?