There were several persistent issues fans and pundits had with Gregg Berhalter and the USMNT in 2019, beyond results.
Four of the biggest were:
The continued presence on rosters of mid-20s players, from MLS, that were given minutes no matter how they performed for the USMNT or in MLS.
The almost Puritanical need to “Play Out of the Back”, no matter the game state or opposition defense.
A passive mid-block defense that allowed opponents easy entry into our third of the field.
Substitutions that made no sense in competitive games.
There are two theories among fans and analysts who try and analyze the situation, beyond, “Gregg is an idiot who was only hired because he is brothers with the CEO to be.” Whether there is any truth to that statement is counteracted by the idea that nobody could be that big an idiot. Some will disagree of course.
Both theories start from the idea that Gregg, from the day he was hired, had a set system that he wanted to play. That he would find players that fit the system, rather than devise a system that fit the players he had.
The first theory is that Gregg wanted to only rely on data and “player profiles” based on data collected by services like Opta. This tries to explain the #1 complaint by pointing out that most of our talent in Europe is very young, few have first team minutes in large quantities, so there is no Opta data. That since Gregg was only selecting players he could get data on, they mostly were mid-twenties players in MLS who had mountains of data available. Players with good amounts of data could be added, like Pulisic, Brooks, Ream. But players like Richie Ledezma could not.
This theory kind of hits the snag at the exclusion of plenty of players with lots of first team minutes like Antonee Robinson, Duane Holmes, Julian Green, Fabian Johnson, etc. It also doesn’t address #2, 3, 4 in any way other than, Gregg is “naïve”.
My theory, based on things discussed by media members with insider access, is that 2019 was an experiment in a “Moneyball” approach. This is a popular sporting concept in the USA and increasingly around the world. It is looking for incremental competitive advantages using statistical analysis to offset competitive disadvantages in talent disparity. The famous example is how the Oakland A’s used the statistical work of Bill James to build a team on par with the Yankees and Red Sox on 1/50th the budget.
The idea Gregg, and Earnie Stewart, had and possibly still have, is that the MLS season is very different from the European and South American seasons. The long winter break allows for a long national team training camp in January (Camp Cupcake). Brazil, Germany, France, etc. do not have this opportunity for a long, like a club pre-season, camp. That the extra time could be used to teach a complicated, Pep Guardiola-esque, positional offense that would allow the USMNT, with less talent, to compete with the previous mentioned teams; who can’t run sophisticated offenses because the short windows national teams have together.
Data was used to pick the original January pool. They were drilled in the new system. The idea was that these players would then be able to carry that knowledge forward and help train additional players. New players would be brought in a few at a time until they got up to speed then more could be integrated. This is why the rosters throughout the year featured so many players from January camp (Cupcakers). This is why only the top players in Europe were initially brought in in small numbers. In June, longer camps were held and more non-MLS players were brought in. But when the Gold Cup roster was announced, in the end, it contained 14 Cupcakers out of 23 players. This roughly 2/3rds ratio of Cupcakers to non-Cupcakers was very consistent throughout 2019.
There is no way to teach a possession based positional read and react offense (The System) without playing it. This is why all year, until the final Canada game, the USA played out of the back almost exclusively. Even in the Friendly against Mexico, with Mexico probably figuring out this entire plan and that the USA was not going to go over the top, against 7 and 8 men presses, they played in to the pressure.
But how does this explain why the USMNT played a passive mid-block defense that made teams like Curacao and Canada look like Spain? The defense was deployed by Gregg not to win games or even to win the ball. It was designed to create goal kicks for the USA. The more goal kicks, the more opportunities to play out from the back and practice The System. Since the most limited thing a national team has is minutes of game time, every minute was maximized as a training exercise.
Down by a goal in the Gold Cup Final, Gregg substituted on Roldan for Morris, Zardes for Altidore, and Lovitz for Ream. The last one is really perplexing because Lovitz is not only not a goal threat, but is not even good. This one is discussed a lot because it is so questionable. But all three are Cupcakers subbing in for non-Cupcakers. Gregg must have felt a better execution of The System would lead to a goal or viewed the Gold Cup Final as another training exercise like all the previous games.
Following the second Mexico loss and the loss in Canada, pressure mounted. Against Canada in Orlando, some things changed. The roster was still heavily infested with Cupcakers, but only 4 ended up playing. The USMNT played goal kicks short, but never passed back to the goal keeper like previously. If another short pass was not on, the ball was hit long to a forward. Contrast that with the Mexico friendly where passing back was used to keep possession at all costs; frequently ending up at the feet of a center back on the goal line or in Steffan’s 6 yard box. The USMNT did not sit in a passive mid-block, but instead used a form of high press that led to turnovers and transition goals. The subs were mostly defense for offense which made sense with a multi-goal lead.
I believe several flaws in the “moneyball” approach became apparent:
The Cupcakers that were relied upon were simply not good enough
The reliance on a core Group, doesn’t allow for new or in form players to be integrated quickly or at all.
Most of the young talent breaking through last year and in the upcoming years, will be in Europe and will not be able to attend Camp Cupcake.
The team did not look comfortable executing The System at any point and that is either because Gregg could not teach it, the players could not execute it, or even with the large amount of Cupcakers the European players couldn’t learn it, or the European players could execute it but the MLS players couldn’t keep up.
We don’t know if it has been abandoned and we don’t know if Gregg thinks it was a failure at all. We probably will not know until March at the earliest, maybe not until the CONCACAF National League Final or even World Cup Qualifying in August.
Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)
I said after Mauricio Pochettino’s extension that I didn’t expect him to make it through the 2030 cycle as #USMNT manager, whether due to results or another club offering him a deal he couldn’t refuse. However, I never expected things to reach this point so close to the start of the cycle.
In some ways, the timing might not be the worst, provided US Soccer can quickly interview and hire a replacement well before the March FIFA window. That said, I was really starting to buy into Pochettino’s vision and his commitment to building the #USMNT around youth.
Hopefully, US Soccer recognizes the value of having a high-profile manager and pursues another big name like Pep Guardiola, Didier Deschamps or Julian Nagelsmann. My gut, however, tells me they’ll pivot back toward an American coach or an experienced MLS manager like Wilfried Nancy.
Another intriguing option is Marko Mitrović, former U19, U20 and U23 USMNT manager and current New England Revolution coach. He already has experience working with many of the young players in the current player pool.
Here’s a look at some of the most likely American candidates to become the next USMNT manager.
Michael Bradley (39)
I truly believe Michael Bradley will someday manage the USMNT. His soccer intelligence, leadership qualities, and playing experience across Europe and MLS give him both an international perspective and a deep understanding of American soccer culture. However, Bradley likely projects more as a candidate for the 2034 cycle at the earliest and he still needs time to develop at the club level.
B. J. Callaghan (45)
It would be difficult not to include B.J. Callaghan after the positive impression he made as interim USMNT manager. Coming off an MLS-best record and Supporters’ Shield title, Callaghan continues to demonstrate his ability to prepare and get the most out of his teams despite a relatively limited managerial résumé. He earned the trust of the players and fans by delivered strong performances during his time with the national team. If the position opens again, U.S. Soccer would almost certainly explore his interest.
Steve Cherundolo (47)
Steve Cherundolo may be one cycle away from becoming a serious candidate, especially after recently leaving MLS to return to Germany. Still, his experience as both a player and manager at high levels of the game makes him someone U.S. Soccer should strongly consider.
Jim Curtin (47)
If Pochettino can be convinced to leave the #USMNT, perhaps newly appointed Austin FC manager Jim Curtin could also be persuaded to make the move if U.S. Soccer views him as the right fit. His success with the Philadelphia Union, highlighted by winning the 2020 Supporters’ Shield, showcased his ability to build a strong team culture and maximize the talent at his disposal.
Pellegrino Matarazzo (48)
I’m not convinced U.S. Soccer would seriously pursue Pellegrino Matarazzo, but hopefully I’m wrong. His success coaching in Europe has made him one of the most respected American-born managers in the game and a popular choice among many fans for the future of the USMNT.
Brian Schmetzer (63)
With eight trophies to his name, Brian Schmetzer may be one of the strongest and most accomplished domestic candidates available. His biggest achievement came when he led Seattle Sounders FC to the 2022 CONCACAF Champions League title, becoming the first MLS club to win the tournament under its modern format.
Peter Vermes (59)
Former USMNT striker Peter Vermes deserves consideration given his success at Sporting KC, where he won four trophies as a manager. Vermes previously turned down interest from U.S. Soccer, but with him no longer actively coaching at club level, the timing could finally align for a move into the international game.
The Importance of Having a Succession Plan
The next USMNT manager could inherit a player pool filled with established veterans and exciting young talent, but U.S. Soccer’s vision and priorities have shifted frequently between cycles. If Pochettino is indeed leaving, that could send the federation in a different direction with its next hire.
My hope is that the long-term vision remains consistent with the approach heading into the 2022 World Cup. Given that Pochettino’s contract reportedly included a $10 million buyout clause, you would hope U.S. Soccer had contingency plans and potential replacements in mind. In recent cycles, the federation has appeared less prepared with backup options than it was in the past. How quickly U.S. Soccer moves will be important, but the search cannot drag on indefinitely. A process lasting a few months is reasonable, provided the federation identifies the right candidate well ahead of the next major FIFA window.
Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)
With the next wave of highly rated teenagers likely to be brought into the #USMNT during the 2030 World Cup cycle, I decided to look back at some of the young players who were once hyped as the next stars of the U.S. Men’s National Team but never established themselves as regular internationals.
Freddy Adu would seem to be at the top of this list. While he never became a regular for the #USMNT or the world-class face of U.S. Soccer many expected, he still earned 17 caps, scoring 2 goals and adding 3 assists. In many ways, he accomplished more at the international level than most of the players who are listed below combined.
Which former USMNT prospects did I miss, players who are no longer playing or are past their prime, who deserve to be on this list?
Cody Cropper – GK – 0 caps
U.S. youth international and longtime goalkeeper prospect who reached the Southampton and MLS systems but never earned a senior cap.
Junior Flores – AM – 0 caps
Creative midfielder who joined Borussia Dortmund’s system as a teenager and was viewed as a major U.S. prospect, but never reached the senior USMNT.
Eddie Gaven – MF/W – 8 caps
Teenage MLS phenom who became a league standout, but despite eight USMNT appearances, his international career never developed further.
Luis Gil – AM – 2 caps
One of the most hyped American midfield prospects of his generation; debuted for RSL at 16 but never translated that promise into a sustained USMNT career.
Emerson Hyndman – MF – 2 caps
Highly rated central midfielder who broke through at Fulham and earned two USMNT appearances, but never established himself internationally.
Perry Kitchen – DM/CB – 5 caps
U.S. youth captain and defensive midfielder who became a regular MLS starter, but his senior international career stalled after five caps.
Will Packwood – CB/DM – 0 caps
Birmingham City prospect who became the youngest American to play in the English Championship, but injuries severely disrupted his development.
Marc Pelosi – LB/CB – 0 caps
Highly regarded defender who moved to Liverpool as a teenager, but injuries and limited senior opportunities derailed his path to the USMNT.
Gedion Zelalem – MF – 0 caps
Arsenal wonderkid and one of the most highly regarded U.S. prospects of his generation. Injuries and inconsistent senior opportunities slowed his development, and he never made a senior USMNT appearance.
The number of young USMNT players in this September/October window is something we haven’t seen in quite some time. Some will catch the eye of newly extended USMNT manager Mauricio Pochettino, while others may not, but all of them have an opportunity during this cycle to make their case for World Cup qualifying and, ultimately, a spot on the 2026 World Cup roster.
It all starts now, and it should be fun to follow their development over the next four years.
Thomas Deschaine (@uskeeper on X and us_keeper on Instagram)
Header_NextGen
With the USMNT manager in place and the new cycle underway it’s time for recently extended Mauricio Pochettino to get some new young players on his radar and what better time to do this than the September/October double FIFA window.
There are several U-23 players like Josh Wynder, Jalen Neal, Rokas Pukstas, Diego Kochen, Jonathan Gomez, Caleb Wiley, Cole Campbell, Chris Brady, Gaga, Slonina, Niko Tsakiris, Damion Downs, and Benjamin Cremaschi who have no caps order less than a handful with the USMNT.
Will USMNT snubs or overlooked players opportunities be during the 2030 cycle look like? Players like Diego Luna, Tanner Tessmann, Aidan Morris and Camron Carter-Vickers to name a few, we have to wonder how or if they will be part of this cycle of players. I would suggest some will likely get the opportunity in the early part of the cycle but will need to be performing n with their club to remain getting called back into camps.
Integrating a few of these youth USMNT players during each window for the first half of the cycle will allow Pochettino to evaluate them up close and see if there might be a role for them during this next cycle.
It’s extremely important that the USMNT have a few on their current U-20 teenagers’ breakthrough and become a reliable part of the USMNT in the second half of the cycle.
The below players will have an opportunity to play in next years U-20 World Cup being hosted by Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan as well as hopefully if their clubs release them being part of the 2028 Olympics USA Football squad to hopefully medal for the first time since 1904 when the US had two teams win Silver and Bronze. I think it’s also important to look at these players alongside some of the core USMNT in the upcoming window to see how they can integrate with one another.
Mathis Albert-17-Winger
Noahkai Banks-19-Centerback
Cole Campbell-20-Midfielder/Winger
Zavier Gozo-19-Winger
Julian Hall-18-Winger
Malik Jakupovic-17-Striker
Adri Mehmeti-17-Central Midfielder
Peyton Miller-18-Left Midfielder/Winger
Neil Pierre-18-Centerback
Cavan Sullivan-16-Attacking Midfielder
Whether we see all of these players, or just a handful, through the first half of the cycle, hopefully leading into another Copa América appearance, it’s clear that the time has come for Pochettino to begin integrating the next generation of USMNT players into the senior pool. How quickly that transition happens will be one of the most interesting storylines to follow.